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 SPEAKER DISCRIMINATION: 
THE NEXT FRONTIER OF FREE SPEECH 
MICHAEL KAGAN? 
ABSTRACT 
 Citizens United v. FEC articulated a pillar of free speech doctrine that is independent 
from the well-known controversies about corporate personhood and the role of money in 
elections. For the first time, the Supreme Court clearly said that discrimination on the basis 
of the identity of the speaker offends the First Amendment. Previously, the focus of free 
speech doctrine had been on the content and forum of speech, not on the identity of the 
speaker. It is possible that protection from speaker identity discrimination had long been 
implicit in free speech case law, but has now been given more full-throated articulation. Or 
it is possible that the Court has actually introduced a conceptually new free speech doctrine.  
Either way, Citizens United has the potential to reshape free speech law far beyond the cor-
porate speech and campaign finance contexts. This Article explores the basis of the speaker 
discrimination doctrine and points to potential implications. It shows that while the speaker 
discrimination principle had not been previously articulated clearly, it is a convincing ex-
planation for much earlier First Amendment cases and thus should not be understood as an 
entirely new development. The speaker discrimination principle holds considerable potential 
to clarify otherwise confused areas of free speech jurisprudence. In particular, the bar 
against identity discrimination should operate as a limiting principle on forum-based 
speech restrictions. To illustrate this potential, this Article examines the potential applica-
tion of speaker discrimination to school speech cases, especially those involving off-campus 
speech. At the same time, the Court’s embrace of speaker discrimination raises important 
questions in critical legal theory about why the identity of a speaker might matter in addi-
tion to the substance of what a person chooses to say. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Citizens United v. FEC1 is famously controversial for equating 
communications by corporations with free expression by human be-
ings, a premise that has become a recurring lighting rod in American 
political discourse.2 But this controversy has led to an under appreci-
ation of an important contribution that Citizens United made to First 
Amendment jurisprudence which is entirely severable from questions 
about corporate personhood and election law.  
 Modern free speech cases typically focus extensively on content 
neutrality and on distinguishing public and nonpublic fora.3 In Citi-
zens United, the majority of the Supreme Court announced what may 
be a new pillar of free speech law. With Citizens United, the Court for 
the first time gave full-throated articulation to the principle that dis-
crimination on the basis of the identity of the speaker is offensive to 
the First Amendment, even when there is no content discrimination. 
This newly articulated doctrine has the potential to reshape free 
speech law far beyond the corporate and election contexts.  
 There are two views that one may take about what the Court said 
about speaker discrimination in Citizens United. The view promoted 
by the dissent in the 5-4 decision was that the majority essentially 
invented this “pillar” of its reasoning without a solid foundation in 
pre-existing case law.4 For the dissenters, the speaker discrimination 
principle appeared just as divisive as the corporate personhood por-
tions of the majority decision.5 Based on the perception that speaker 
                                                                                                                                 
 1. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 2. During the 2012 presidential election, President Barack Obama ridiculed Gover-
nor Mitt Romney for saying that corporations are people. See, e.g., Amy Gardner & Felicia 
Sonmez, In Formal Campaign Kick-Off, Obama Dings Romney’s ‘Corporations Are People’ 
Line, WASH. POST (May 5, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-05-05/ 
politics/35454922_1_obama-campaign-romney-campaign-michelle-obama. In a similar vein, 
in 2013, senators proposed a constitutional amendment providing that corporations are not 
people. See Press Release, Sen. Jon Tester, Tester’s Constitutional Amendment: Corpora-
tions Are Not ‘People’ (June 18, 2013), available at http://www.tester.senate. 
gov/?p=press_release&id=2970; see also Rep. Adam Schiff, The Supreme Court Still Thinks 
Corporations Are People, THE ATLANTIC (July 18, 2012, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/07/the-supreme-court-still-thinks-corporations- 
are-people/259995/ (congressman proposing constitutional amendment).  
 3. See McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168, slip op. at 9 (U.S. June 26, 2014) (noting 
that prohibition on content discrimination is “the guiding First Amendment principle”). For 
a critique of the content-focused approach, see Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: 
Re-Thinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1347 (2006). 
 4. 558 U.S. at 419-420 (“The second pillar of the Court’s opinion is its assertion that 
‘the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speak-
er’s . . . identity.’ . . . Like its paeans to unfettered discourse, the Court’s denunciation of 
identity-based distinctions may have rhetorical appeal but it obscures reality.”) (J. Stevens, 
dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 5. See infra Part 0. 
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discrimination principle was wholly new, doubts have already been 
expressed about whether the Court really meant to announce a broad 
new principle.6 But another view––and in my opinion, the better 
one—is that Citizens United did not invent a new doctrine, but rather 
gave new, clearer articulation to a principle that had long been im-
plicit and underappreciated in free speech jurisprudence. Under ei-
ther view, Citizens United may in the long run serve as a foundation 
for a new frontier of speech law, independent of its impact on cam-
paign finance regulation. Moreover, the speaker discrimination prin-
ciple is at its core a progressive idea that embraces the importance of 
identity and the symbolic power of having a voice, independent of 
what one chooses to say. But because the Court first clearly articu-
lated this doctrine in such a broadly controversial decision, there is 
significant danger that merits of this aspect of the decision will be 
underappreciated. 
 This Article makes the case that the speaker discrimination prin-
ciple in Citizens United deserves widespread support and application. 
I will show that the underlying principle that speaker discrimination 
infringes free speech has long been implicit in case law, even if it had 
not been clearly spelled out. In particular, I demonstrate that the re-
nowned First Amendment case, City of Chicago v. Mosley, should be 
understood as an early application of the speaker discrimination doc-
trine because the regulation at issue restricted who could protest 
outside of a public school more than it restricted what they could 
say.7 As a result, Citizens United should be understood as articulat-
ing and explaining a set of principles that have long been implicit in 
the case law. Now that the Court has more explicitly articulated the 
doctrine, it can be more readily applied in future cases; but this does 
not mean that the Court suddenly invented a new rule without any 
precedent. 
 The speaker discrimination doctrine, now that it is clearly articu-
lated, raises important questions about problematic areas of First 
Amendment law, such as limitations on speech in so-called limited 
public fora, restrictions on speech by public employees, and prohibi-
tions on non-citizens participating in election campaigns. But these 
tensions may only be brought to the Court’s attention if speech advo-
cates first embrace the merit and potential power of the speaker dis-
crimination doctrine.  
 By incorporating the idea of the speaker’s identity and voice into 
First Amendment doctrine, the Citizens United majority borrowed a 
central tenet of critical legal theory and, at the same time, touched on 
                                                                                                                                 
 6. See Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 
123 YALE L.J. 412, 420-22 (2013). 
 7. See infra Part 0. 
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a challenging question. Even among those who advocate for the in-
clusion of more diverse voices in public discourse, there is little con-
sensus about why speaker identity matters. Consider a recent con-
troversy that illustrates this ambiguity. In early 2012, there was con-
siderable outcry on the political left when all-male congressional 
panels held hearings on reproductive rights without allowing any 
women to speak.8 But even among those who protested, there was no 
consensus on exactly why the all-male hearing was a problem. Is it 
always objectionable when Congress hears only male voices on any 
issue, or is this objection relevant only when the subject of discussion 
is reproductive freedom, an issue that has unique impact on women? 
Moreover, would the objection be addressed simply by inviting any 
woman to speak, or must that woman express a particular viewpoint? 
Both in law and in critical legal theory, there is little clarity about 
how we should disentangle the identity of a speaker from the sub-
stance of speech, and about whether the two can ever actually be 
separated.  
 The Supreme Court has long struggled to adopt a unitary philoso-
phy about why the U.S. Constitution protects free speech. The most 
commonly repeated rationale has been the idea that there should be 
a free marketplace for ideas. But this does not explain the Court’s 
recognition that identity is as much a part of speech as explicit con-
tent. Nor does it explain the Court’s longstanding protection of artis-
tic expression or expression without a clearly articulated idea. A bet-
ter explanation for the broad sweep of the First Amendment is that a 
broad conception of free speech helps to allow diverse groups of peo-
ple to coexist by allowing a means by which everyone can pursue in-
dividual expression while also negotiating their place in society. Citi-
zens United should thus be understood both as a step away from the 
marketplace model of free speech and as a step toward autonomy and 
agency rationales for free expression. 
 As a practical doctrinal matter, it is important to identify the im-
pact that this new pillar of free speech law might make on other 
types of cases. I argue that speaker discrimination can help to clarify 
the limits of speech limitations that are tied to limited public fora. 
The principle that identity-based restrictions on speech offend the 
Constitution should operate as a limiting principle to contain the im-
pact of forum-based restrictions on speech. As an illustration, I will 
look at school speech cases, especially cases where students are disci-
                                                                                                                                 
 8. See, e.g., Laura Bassett, GOP Men Debate Anti-Abortion Bill as Female Colleagues 
Protest in the Hallway, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2014, 2:07 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/15/house-gop-abortion_n_4603349.html; George 
Zornick, Republican Hearing on Contraception: No Women Allowed, THE NATION (Feb. 16, 
2012, 11:14 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/166311/republican-hearing-contraception-
no-women-allowed.  
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plined at school for off-campus speech, which is an area of free speech 
jurisprudence that has confused circuit courts. The school speech 
question is apropos to speaker discrimination because the Mosley de-
cision related specifically to protests outside a public school where 
the local government asserted concern about disruption to the educa-
tional environment.9 The newly clarified speaker discrimination doc-
trine should be helpful to clarify lingering questions about the regu-
lation of speech in the school context. 
 This Article proceeds as follows. Part II explains the free speech 
landscape before Citizens United with regard to speaker identity, 
while Part III suggests reasons why the speaker identity question 
was not clearly addressed by the Court prior to 2010. Part IV ex-
plains why this issue emerged in the context of Citizens United, how 
the majority filled the speaker identity gap, and the reaction of the 
four dissenting justices. Part V explores why speaker identity mat-
ters to freedom of speech. Part VI shows that, while the speaker dis-
crimination doctrine had not been previously articulated so clearly, it 
is a convincing explanation for much earlier First Amendment cases. 
In Part VII, I turn to the potential that speaker discrimination holds 
to clarify otherwise confused areas of free speech jurisprudence, with 
particular focus on school speech cases. I conclude in Part VIII, point-
ing out problematic areas of case law that should be re-considered in 
light of the speaker discrimination doctrine.  
II.   THE SPEAKER IDENTITY GAP 
 In Norman Rockwell’s famous poster Freedom of Speech, part of 
the Four Freedoms series, a slightly rumpled man in working class 
clothing—he literally wears a blue collar—stands to speak at a 
crowded public meeting. We do not know what he says. But just over 
his right shoulder an older, gray-haired man in a black suit and tie 
looks up intently to listen. The idea seems to be that in the United 
States, even an average man’s voice matters, and everyone has the 
right to stand and speak.10 It seems beside the point that we do not 
know what this meeting is even about. 
 What is surprising about this painting is that its romantic vision 
of American free speech had until recently been only partially incor-
porated into First Amendment doctrine. While Rockwell found that 
he could depict the idea of free speech without identifying the content 
                                                                                                                                 
 9. See infra Part 0. 
 10. Women are barely pictured in the painting, and all the faces are white. The paint-
ing illustrates diversity only in terms of social class, with depictions of working class and 
white collar, presumably wealthier, white men. In this way, the painting seems very much 
a creature of the 1940s. However, the point of the painting would seem to work equally 
well if the speakers represented a broader array of races, ethnicities, and genders.  
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of speech, content has traditionally been the central issue for courts 
in speech cases. The starting point for free speech doctrine is content 
neutrality.11 The First Amendment has little tolerance for content 
discrimination, especially in a public forum, and even less tolerance 
for viewpoint discrimination.12 There are, of course, some exceptions. 
Government may impose time, place, and manner restrictions on 
many forms of public expression, but the regulations must be content 
neutral.13 Government may restrict fighting words and may also pun-
ish violent threats. Hurtful communications that do not involve mat-
ters of public concern may lead to a tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.14 But the touchstone for analysis of all of these 
issues is content.  
 The other major theme in free speech cases is forum.15 Despite the 
strong protection of free expression in the American constitution, 
there are certain locations where the government clearly should have 
more latitude to restrict speech than it does in a public park.16 To 
take an easy illustration, freedom of speech obviously applies differ-
ently to a police officer watching demonstrators gather on the Na-
tional Mall than it does to a public school teacher who requires stu-
dents to be quiet during math class. In both cases, a government em-
ployee might in a literal sense impair the ability of citizens to express 
themselves how and when they want to. But the contexts are obvi-
ously not the same, and the First Amendment protects freedom of 
speech more broadly in one than the other. 
 Although Rockwell used a public meeting as the quintessential 
free speech forum for his illustration, it is not actually the most per-
missive forum in constitutional law. Despite the romantic view pre-
sented by Rockwell—and much earlier by Alexis de Tocqueville’s ear-
                                                                                                                                 
 11. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:1 
(2014), available at Westlaw (“The characterization of a law as content-based or content-
neutral is enormously important, for it often effectively determines the outcome of First 
Amendment litigation.”); see also McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168, slip op. at 9 (U.S. June 
26, 2014) (noting that prohibition on content discrimination is “the guiding First Amend-
ment principle”). 
 12. Viewpoint discrimination is a narrower category than content discrimination. 
Content discrimination prohibits certain types of communication and certain subject mat-
ter. SMOLLA. § 3:8. Viewpoint discrimination “regulates speech based upon agreement or 
disagreement with the particular position the speaker wishes to express.” Id. § 3:9. 
 13. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972). 
 14. The tort is limited by the First Amendment if it restricts the “free flow of ideas 
and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.” Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). See generally SMOLLA, supra note 11, § 24:10 (discussing the Fal-
well case). 
 15. See Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of “Place” in First Amend-
ment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2587-88 (2007). 
 16. See Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 647, 651 (2010). 
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ly 19th Century appreciation of town meetings in New England17—
public comment at public meetings is often limited. The reason for 
this is fairly straightforward. City council and school board meetings 
need to have agendas. They need to be able to control when different 
issues are brought up, who can speak and for how long. Otherwise, a 
single disruptive speaker could use the First Amendment to prevent 
any business from being conducted in public meetings. Such meet-
ings are thus an example of limited public fora, wherein the govern-
ment may restrict speech by subject matter but not necessarily by 
viewpoint.18 Thus, a town board may be able to limit when citizens 
may make comments about tax rates (subject matter), but once public 
comment is open, the board may not only allow people to speak in 
favor of higher taxes while silencing those who want to protest their 
tax burdens (viewpoint discrimination).19  
 This distinction between subject matter and viewpoint still leaves 
unclear the issue that Rockwell wanted to illustrate most pointedly. 
Rockwell in particular wanted to show that in an American public 
meeting, a rich man should have to be willing to listen to a common 
man. This hardly seems controversial, but it is actually not well es-
tablished in our jurisprudence. Since we do not know what the man 
is saying, we cannot easily fit it into a viewpoint discrimination anal-
ysis. Some courts had hinted at the speaker identity issue, but the 
inclination was to relate speaker discrimination to content discrimi-
nation, which had a more established jurisprudential basis.20 Until 
Citizens United, the Supreme Court actually never quite said that 
everyone should be able to stand and speak, independent of what 
they choose to say. In more precise doctrinal terms, the Court had 
never explicitly said that the government would need a particularly 
compelling justification to restrict who may speak. We could call this 
the speaker identity gap.  
 In a 2004 (pre-Citizens United) case that brings Rockwell’s paint-
ing directly to mind, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
approved a municipal rule limiting the speech of non-residents dur-
ing city council meetings.21 Several lower courts had noted that mu-
nicipalities had the authority to cut off speech to prevent chaotic 
meetings.22 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the city 
                                                                                                                                 
 17. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 57-58 (J.P. Mayer & Max Ler-
ner eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1835). 
 18. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995) 
(holding that content-based discrimination is permissible in limited public fora but that 
viewpoint discrimination is not permissible). 
 19. Id.  
 20. See id. 
 21. Rowe v. City of Cocoa, 358 F.3d 800, 803-04 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 22. Id. at 803. 
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had an interest in efficient meetings, and thus could restrict the par-
ticipation of non-residents.23 But there are many ways to maintain 
order without excluding an entire class of people from the opportuni-
ty to be heard. The town could put a limit on the number of speakers 
who would be heard or the length of time they could speak. But the 
town chose to limit participation in a public meeting based on the 
identity of the speaker. 
 In the mid-1980s, the Court explicitly endorsed exclusions based 
on speaker identity with regard to limited public fora. In Perry Edu-
cation Association, the Court held that a school district’s collective 
bargaining agreement could exclude a rival teacher’s union from 
communicating through the school mail system.24 The Court noted 
that even in a limited public forum, the government could not dis-
criminate against the speaker’s “view,” although it could impose rea-
sonable limitations to ensure that the forum is used “for its intended 
purposes . . . .”25 The union argued that its exclusion amounted to 
viewpoint discrimination, but the Court disagreed: “We believe it is 
more accurate to characterize the access policy as based on the status 
of the respective unions rather than their views. Implicit in the con-
cept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access 
on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity.”26 The Perry 
Court went on to hold that the case would come out no differently if 
analyzed as an Equal Protection Clause case.27 In Cornelius, the 
Court repeated these principles to permit excluding the exclusion of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) from the Combined Federal Campaign, which solicits dona-
tions from federal employees.28 The Cornelius Court found that the 
government could exclude the NAACP because it would be seen as 
“political” or “controversial,” thus undermining the purposes of the 
limited forum.29 
 Perry and Cornelius appeared to give government wide latitude to 
choose among speakers in limited public fora, and would seem to ex-
plain the Eleventh Circuit’s decision on excluding non-residents from 
municipal meetings. But these cases also illustrate the difficulty in 
                                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. at 803-04.  
 24. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 52-55 (1983).  
 25. Id. at 46. 
 26. Id. at 49. 
 27. Id. at 54. 
 28. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (“Alt-
hough a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic 
not encompassed within the purpose of the forum, or if he is not a member of the class of 
speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created, the government violates the 
First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he 
espouses on an otherwise includible subject.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 29. Id. at 810, 812. 
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distinguishing identity-based discrimination from viewpoint discrim-
ination. This is perhaps most obvious in the Cornelius case. The rea-
son why the NAACP could be considered controversial was, presum-
ably, because of its views on civil rights issues.  But the exclusion of 
non-residents from a local government meeting also illustrates why 
viewpoint and speaker are difficult to separate. What if a nonresident 
developer wanted to address city leaders? What if a nonresident had 
information relevant to city policies? What if a nonresident had a 
complaint about how the city treats nonresidents? If a town board 
opened meeting to public comment on property taxes but then limited 
the forum to people who actually own property, our well-established 
doctrines of free speech would not clearly indicate that anything 
is wrong.  
 These examples illustrate how even facially neutral restrictions on 
who may speak can do a great deal to impair the public’s ability to 
engage in free debate.30 The difference between a legitimate limita-
tion on expression and an unconstitutional interference with free de-
bate will often appear to be a matter of degree.31 The decisive point 
was that the Court of Appeals did not have an analytical method or a 
doctrinal tool that clearly fit a speech restriction based on content or 
viewpoint. The Eleventh Circuit relied on the fact that in a town 
meeting content discrimination is permissible, but viewpoint discrim-
ination is not.32 But a residency requirement is really neither of 
these. It is a restriction on who can speak, not the subject matter or 
the viewpoint. 
III.   WHY SPEAKER DISCRIMINATION REMAINED IMPLICIT 
RATHER THAN EXPLICIT IN FREE SPEECH CASE LAW  
 Cases that raise speaker discrimination issues can often be decid-
ed on alternative grounds, which explains why the Court did not fully 
articulate the doctrine until Citizens United. For example, the Court 
may have taken a step to limit government authority in limited pub-
lic fora in Good News Club v. Milford Central School, where the 
Court found that a school violated a Christian organization’s free 
speech rights when it refused to let it use school facilities that were 
open to secular civic organizations.33 The holding could be explained 
as discrimination based on the religious identity of the organization. 
But the Court did not quite frame it that way. The club wished to 
hold programs devoted to subject matter that the school otherwise 
                                                                                                                                 
 30. See McDonald, supra note 3, at 1410; Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Re-
strictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 54-55 (1987). 
 31. Stone, supra note 30, at 55.  
 32. Rowe v. City of Cocoa, 358 F.3d 800, 803-04 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 33. 533 U.S. 98, 109-12 (2001). 
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permitted, so that the prohibition was solely based on its religious 
orientation.34 As a result, the Court labeled the exclusion a matter of 
viewpoint discrimination.35  
 Good News Club thus could be read as shifting weight back to the 
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination, which seemed to have had 
little impact in the earlier Cornelius and Perry cases, in which the 
Court permitted governments to exclude a labor union and a civil 
rights organization from limited fora.36 But since Good News Club 
followed Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, a case that also in-
volved discrimination against religiously oriented speakers, it was 
not clear whether the Court was changing its approach in cases that 
lacked a religious element.37 Both cases focused extensively on Estab-
lishment Clause questions, and thus may not appear readily applica-
ble to other contexts. But more to the point, since viewpoint discrimi-
nation is often hard to distinguish from speaker discrimination, the 
Court often has not had to spell out the speaker discrimination con-
cept in so many words.38  
 This phenomenon can be seen in the early free speech case Hague 
v. CIO, where a local ordinance banned labor organizers from holding 
public meetings.39 That case concerned what the Court today would 
call a public forum, and thus any content discrimination would be 
potentially offensive to the First Amendment. The city discriminated 
against labor advocacy and against “Communists or Communist or-
ganizations.”40 The exclusions were thus both a form of content and 
viewpoint discrimination and identity-based discrimination. But the 
Court did not need to tease the two types of discrimination apart to 
decide the matter. 
                                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. at 108. 
 35. Id. at 107. 
 36. See id. at 106, 122. In both cases, it would not have been difficult to attribute a 
viewpoint to the union or to the NAACP, just as a viewpoint was attributed to a Christian 
organization in Good News Club. This was especially the case in Cornelius, since the 
NAACP was excluded because it was “controversial.” As a result, a reasonable reading of 
Cornelius and Perry might indicate that the ostensible bar on viewpoint discrimination did 
not have much decisive force.  
 37. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 
(1995). But see Jason E. Manning, Comment, Good News Club v. Milford Central School: 
Viewpoint Discrimination or Endorsement of Religion?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 833 (2003) 
(noting ambiguity about whether the Court is analogizing religion to secular viewpoints for 
free speech purposes or overtly privileging religion at the expense of the separation of 
church and state).  
 38. See, e.g,, McCullen v. Coakley, No. 12-1168, slip op. at 25-27 (U.S. June 26, 2014) 
at 2526, 2539-2540 (striking down a statute creating a buffer zone around reproductive 
health clinics that exempted certain types of people, but doing so because less intrusive 
means were available to accomplish the state’s objectives.) 
 39. Hague v. Comm. for Ind. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514-16 (1939). 
 40. Id. at 501. 
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 When a certain type of speaker is excluded because of religiosity, 
the case is likely to center on the question of whether the state has a 
legitimate Establishment Clause rationale.41 If a speaker were to be 
excluded on the basis of a protected classification, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause would settle the issue in a more straightforward manner. 
As the name implies, the speaker discrimination principle suggests 
that there is an anti-discrimination component to the First Amend-
ment. But for this to matter, we need to understand what the First 
Amendment might add that would not accomplished by reference to 
Equal Protection. 
 The first key for a plaintiff to successfully challenge a government 
policy on constitutional grounds is to convince a court to apply 
heightened scrutiny. This then shifts the burden to the government 
to show an especially important interest and that the policy is well-
tailored to achieve that interest.42 There are two established triggers 
to heightened scrutiny. The first is if the government discriminates 
on the basis of a suspect classification, such as race43 or gender.44 The 
other trigger for heightened scrutiny is an infringement of a funda-
mental right, and thus a potential violation of due process.45 Freedom 
of speech has been recognized by the Court as a fundamental right 
since 1925.46 
 If a state were to ban people from speaking on the basis of race, 
heightened scrutiny would apply because of the equal protection vio-
lation. In the most egregious cases, it would be unnecessary for a 
court to consider whether the First Amendment also protects against 
discrimination based on speaker identity. So, if a town were to say 
that only white people may speak at a public meeting, a court could 
strike down the regulation based solely on the Equal Protection 
Clause. The speaker identity gap in free speech doctrine becomes far 
more important where the identity-based discrimination is not based 
on a suspect classification in terms of the equal protection. In this 
situation, the only route to heightened scrutiny is to argue that there 
is an interference with a fundamental right. To make this case, a 
plaintiff would need to argue that to impair someone from being able 
                                                                                                                                 
 41. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114-15. 
 42. Precise formulations vary. In classic strict scrutiny, the policy must be narrowly 
tailored to a compelling state interest; but in other heightened scrutiny cases, the Court 
uses different adjectives, such as “important” and “closely tailored.” See, e.g., Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).  
 43. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 44. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
 45. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 389 (When a law interferes with the exercise of a funda-
mental right, “it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state 
interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only these interests.”). 
 46. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
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to speak based on who they are rather than what they say is a viola-
tion of free speech. But this is not something that the Supreme Court 
had ever said clearly before 2010. As one commentator observed five 
years before Citizens United, there was “no singular First Amend-
ment approach to speaker discrimination in relation to content  
discrimination.”47 
 A factual scenario that illustrates this gap can be seen in the 1951 
case Niemotko v. Maryland.48 The City of Havre de Grace, Maryland, 
denied a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses a permit to hold Bible talks in 
a public park on Sundays. The testimony at trial had indicated that 
the permit was denied because the applicants got into a verbal argu-
ment with the Parks Commissioner, who also appeared to have a 
negative opinion of Jehovah’s Witnesses.49 The Court recognized that 
this implicated both the First Amendment and Equal Protection: 
The right to equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of those 
freedoms of speech and religion protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments, has a firmer foundation than the whims or 
personal opinions of a local governing body.50 
The Supreme Court thus noted three separate possible constitutional 
violations: equal protection, freedom of religion, and freedom of 
speech. The reference to equal protection is interesting because, six 
decades after this case was decided, there is still debate as to wheth-
er religion is a suspect classification under the Equal Protection 
Clause.51 However, we can put this question to the side for present 
purposes.  
 Niemotko might have been a chance for the Court to apply the Bill 
of Rights holistically, rather than analyze each Amendment separate-
ly and independently from one another.52 Nevertheless, Niemotko 
was easiest to resolve as a freedom of religion case. A religious group 
was denied a permit to use a public park due to religious animus, im-
pairing the fundamental right of free exercise and perhaps the Estab-
lishment Clause to boot. Precisely because this was an easy case, the 
Court did not have to examine the impairment of free speech in 
depth. But if it did, the religious animus against Jehovah’s Witnesses 
could have been construed as content discrimination—the park’s 
                                                                                                                                 
 47. John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1130 (2005).  
 48. 340 U.S. 268, 269-70 (1951). 
 49. Id. at 272. 
 50. Id.  
 51. See Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection 
Clause: Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909 (2013). 
 52. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 303 passim (2010) (arguing for a holistic approach to the Fourth Amendment that 
would incorporate values from the First and other Amendments). 
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commissioner objected to the content of the religious meeting—which 
would not be a neutral time, place and manner regulation.  
 However, there is another scenario suggested by Niemotko that 
would have been more challenging. What if there had not been evi-
dence of religious animus in the permit denial? The Court noted that 
“the Mayor testified that the permit would probably have been grant-
ed if, at the hearing, the applicants had not started to ‘berate’ the 
Park Commissioner for his refusal to issue the permit.”53 What if the 
evidence showed that the city had denied the Jehovah’s Witnesses a 
permit simply due to personal animus toward one of their leaders? 
Without evidence that the denial was based on religion, the freedom 
of religion violation would fall away. It would also be more difficult to 
show that there was content discrimination. The denial of the permit 
to use the park for expressive purposes would be based on the identi-
ty of the speaker, not on what he planned to express.  
 Denying a permit to meet in the park because of the identity of the 
person making the request could be framed as an Equal Protection 
problem, but this scenario would require invoking the class-of-one 
doctrine.54 But this doctrine has been clouded by confusion. As articu-
lated by the Court in the Olech case, class-of-one cases call only for 
rational basis review.55 Lower courts have divided on whether a 
plaintiff must show malice or animus in order to prevail.56 Judges 
and commentators have lamented the “doctrinal morass” that fol-
lowed the Olech decision.57 The more straightforward approach would 
be to understand the denial of a permit to gather and meet in a park 
as a free speech problem, which should attract strict scrutiny because 
it is a fundamental rights violation. But since the permit denial was 
based on the speaker’s identity, not on the content or subject matter 
of the meeting, a court would have to first conclude that speaker dis-
crimination interferes with the freedom of speech. The court would 
have had to confront the speaker identity gap. 
 Consider also a hypothetical mechanism by which a clever but ill-
willed government could exploit the speaker identity gap to exert in-
fluence over public debate. The clever dictator would need to be wary 
                                                                                                                                 
 53. Niemotko, 340 U.S. at 272.  
 54. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 
 55. Id. (“Our cases have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 
‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently 
from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in 
treatment.”). 
 56. See Shaun M. Gehan, With Malice Toward One: Malice and the Substantive Law 
in “Class of One” Equal Protection Claims in the Wake of Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 
54 ME. L. REV. 329, 333 (2002). 
 57. See Alex M. Hagen, Mixed Motives Speak in Different Tongues: Doctrine, Dis-
course, and Judicial Function in Class-of-One Equal Protection Theory, 58 S.D. L. REV. 197, 
204 (2013) (quoting Judge McConnell of the Court of the Appeals for the Tenth Circuit). 
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of the overlap between free speech and the Equal Protection Clause. 
Since racial and gender classifications are suspect under the Equal 
Protection Clause, the clever censor would search for other categories 
that accomplish the similar goals while not triggering heightened 
scrutiny. But if the government were to discriminate against a class 
of speakers based on some less suspect ground, the Equal Protection 
Clause might require only rational basis review. Restrictions based 
on youth, property ownership, education levels, gun ownership, and 
dozens of other criteria can be highly predictive of political opinions; 
and yet, the restrictions would not attract heightened scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause. Since the Supreme Court had never 
clearly said that discrimination based on speaker identity offends the 
First Amendment, the Equal Protection analysis might conceivably 
carry the day. 
 To illustrate this potential reach of the speaker identity gap, con-
sider three hypothetical scenarios inspired by the 1963 March on 
Washington. Recall that the Kennedy Administration was initially 
opposed to the march and was anxious until the very last moment 
about how it would be conducted.58 Since the event required a permit 
to use the National Mall, there was the potential for the government 
to try to interfere. But there would have been several different ways 
in which the Administration might have tried to do this.  
 First, consider an easy case. Imagine that the government had 
denied the March organizers a permit and openly stated that it was 
because they planned to advocate for civil rights legislation. Since the 
National Mall has been called “the quintessential public forum in the 
civic life of the nation,”59 this would be a textbook case of viewpoint 
discrimination and an obvious violation of the First Amendment.  
 Second, imagine that the government permitted the march to take 
place, but prohibited black people from speaking to large public gath-
erings in the District of Columbia. This would clearly violate the 
Equal Protection Clause (race being a suspect classification). Since 
the Equal Protection Case here would be so simple, a court would not 
need to reach the First Amendment question. 
 Third, imagine that the Administration, knowing that it could nei-
ther prohibit the march based on the substantive message (viewpoint 
discrimination) nor limit the participants according to race, decided 
instead to try to indirectly exclude certain speakers it regarded as 
problematic. They might have focused on John L. Lewis, the head of 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), who origi-
                                                                                                                                 
 58. David Matthews, Kennedy White House Had Jitters Ahead of 1963 March on 
Washington, CNN ONLINE (last updated Aug. 28, 2013, 12:24 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/28/politics/march-on-washington-kennedy-jitters/.  
 59. ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
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nally planned to deliver a sharp critique of the Kennedy approach to 
civil rights.60 Noticing that Lewis was only twenty-three-years-old, 
imagine that the government imposed a condition that speakers at 
large gatherings on the National Mall must be at least thirty years of 
age. To justify this, imagine that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
issued an expert opinion claiming that youth is correlated with high-
er risk of incitement and security disruptions.61 It should neverthe-
less be obvious that something offensive to the Constitution is taking 
place, precisely because such measures can be so easily used to inter-
fere with speech. But in this scenario, well-established constitutional 
doctrines do not offer an easy solution.  
 In this last scenario, the government would not be directly ban-
ning speakers in favor of civil rights; Martin Luther King, Jr. was 
thirty-four and thus could still have appeared, as could an unlimited 
number of other older leaders. Thus, there would no facial viewpoint 
discrimination. There certainly could be an equal protection chal-
lenge to the age restriction, but since people under age thirty are not 
a suspect class and the government would have at least a superficial 
justification for the rule, the restriction might have survived rational 
basis review. Moreover, to argue this case as a focus on age discrimi-
nation would be a distraction from what is really going on. What this 
hypothetically imagines is an effort by government to manipulate 
public expression, and so it is the First Amendment that should be 
the primary touchstone. But First Amendment case law did not clear-
ly address situations like this. So long as the speaker identity gap in 
First Amendment doctrine remained, there was at least a plausible 
constitutional ambiguity that might allow a government censor to 
substantially limit public dissent by regulating who can speak rather 
than focusing on what they can say.  
 I am not necessarily suggesting that a federal court in 1963 would 
actually have permitted the hypothetical exclusion that I proposed to 
go forward. I suspect that a federal judge would have seen through 
such a manipulative, technocratic exclusion of an activist from speak-
ing in the Nation’s premier public forum. I suspect that most judges 
would understand that prohibiting a person from giving a speech on 
the National Mall offends the values of the First Amendment. Before 
Citizens United, the speaker discrimination principle may have been 
an illustration of what Akhil Reed Amar calls the “unwritten Consti-
                                                                                                                                 
 60. See Sonia Grant, March on Washington: John Lewis’ Speech - Then and Now, 
HUFFINGTON POST POLITICS: THE BLOG (last updated Oct. 16, 2013, 5:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sonia-grant/john-lewis-march-on-
washington_b_3767330.html. 
 61. As we will see in Part III, the City of Chicago offered a very similar justification 
for limiting who would picket outside of schools in the 1972 Mosley case. 
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tution.”62 In fact, in the realm of free speech it is not uncommon for 
forms of expression to enjoy constitutional protection even when doc-
trinally it is not entirely clear why.63 Moreover, as I will argue in this 
Article, the speaker discrimination principle has been implicit in free 
speech cases for a long time. 
 My point is that until 2010, the Court had failed to articulate the 
principle of speaker discrimination and that a gap in articulated con-
stitutional doctrine has a number of negative consequences. It raises 
uncertainty, which in the free speech context may silence expression. 
It increases the danger that judicial decision-making will appear sub-
jective, a danger that in speech cases appears especially acute when 
judges are asked to protect speech with which they personally disa-
gree.64 In a marginal case, it increases the risk of judicial inconsisten-
cy and error. For instance, in the Eleventh Circuit’s case regarding 
exclusion of nonresidents from city council meetings, the court was 
not forced to explain why this form of speaker discrimination was 
more permissible than other forms.65 This does not necessarily mean 
that the Eleventh Circuit was wrong in this case. But an advantage 
of articulated doctrine is that it forces judges to ask certain ques-
tions, and thus reduces the chance that important issues will be 
simply ignored. Courts can reach the correct result without such 
structure, but they are more likely to make mistakes.  
 As Justice O’Connor explained in her concurrence in City of Lague 
v. Gilleo, there is good reason to prefer explicit rules of law in the free 
speech arena.66 These dangers are especially real given that in prac-
tical terms a restriction on speech, especially if the government at-
tempts any form of prior restraint, is likely to be argued in court in 
the context of a request of a preliminary or emergency injunction. 
There will not necessarily be an opportunity for extensive briefs and 
reply briefs or for extensive judicial deliberation. A plaintiff will have 
to show––in a motion that is likely to be written under extreme time 
pressure––that they are likely to succeed on the merits. This is much 
                                                                                                                                 
 62. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2012) (discussing 
how case law has, overtime, altered constitutional protection past its strict, textual 
interpretations).  
 63. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169 
passim (2012) (examining the unclear doctrinal rationales for considering nonrepresenta-
tional art to be protected free speech). 
 64. See Adam Liptak, For Justices, Free Speech Often Means ‘Speech I Agree With,’ 
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2014, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
05/06/us/politics/in-justices-votes-free-speech-often-means-speech-i-agree-with.html?_r=0. 
 65. Rowe v. City of Cocoa, 358 F.3d 800, 803 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 66. 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (defending the Court’s focus on 
content neutrality because “[i]t is a rule, in an area where fairly precise rules are better 
than more discretionary and more subjective balancing tests”). 
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easier to do when there is a clearly articulated rule from the  
Supreme Court.  
IV.   CITIZENS UNITED AND SPEAKER DISCRIMINATION  
A.   The Citizens United Majority 
 Although it has attracted relatively little attention, the speaker 
identity gap in free speech case law was a central issue in Citizens 
United.67 The most well-known controversy about Citizens United is 
whether the Court was correct to see government discrimination 
against corporate speakers as a threat to free speech. But for this 
question to be have been relevant, the Court first had to conclude that 
discrimination based on speaker identity is a free speech problem suf-
ficient to trigger heightened scrutiny. As we have seen, the Court had 
not previously said this clearly, and in limited public forum cases like 
Perry and Cornelius, it had actually said the opposite.68  
 Previously, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court 
found unconstitutional a state statute that prohibited corporations 
and banking associations from communicating about most pending 
voter initiatives.69 The Massachusetts statute at issue permitted cor-
porate interventions in initiative campaigns only where the initiative 
“materially . . . affect[s] [any of] the property, business or assets of 
the corporation,” and specifically prohibited corporations from cam-
paigning on initiatives related to income taxation.70 These re-
strictions were thus triggered by the intersection of speaker identity 
(a corporation or banking association) and subject matter (related to 
the company’s business or assets). Such rules had a fairly obvious 
substantive impact; businesses were not able to pool their resources 
for political advocacy. Pro-business viewpoints were clearly targeted 
for special restrictions.  
 The Court struck down the Massachusetts law, but the Court ex-
plained its decision as a routine application of the content discrimi-
nation rule.71 The Bellotti Court introduced the idea that speaker dis-
crimination is a problem by saying that the Massachusetts statute 
“amounts to an impermissible legislative prohibition of speech based 
on the identity of the interests that spokesmen may represent in pub-
                                                                                                                                 
 67. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 394 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that the prohibition on speaker discrimination formed a “basic premise” for the majori-
ty’s reasoning). 
 68. See discussion supra Part 0. 
 69. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978). 
 70. Id. at 768. 
 71. Id. at 784-85 (“In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutional-
ly disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speak-
ers who may address a public issue.” (citation omitted)). 
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lic debate over controversial issues . . . .”72 But the Bellotti Court did 
not elaborate on what it meant or why identity-based restrictions on 
speech are a constitutional problem. Citizens United raised the ques-
tion more cleanly. This is because, unlike the Massachusetts statute 
in Bellotti, the restrictions on independent campaign expenditure at 
issue in Citizens United did not depend on the content of the speech, 
except that corporations, unions, and non-profits could not communi-
cate about candidates.  
 The Court took this opportunity to finally remove the ambiguity 
that had surrounded identity-based speech restrictions. It stated em-
phatically that speaker discrimination is prohibited by the First 
Amendment: “Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among 
different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. . . . Quite 
apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content, moreover, the 
Government may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it iden-
tifies certain preferred speakers.”73 This means that a restrictive pol-
icy that impairs the freedom of just one type of speaker should trig-
ger heightened scrutiny. “The First Amendment protects speech and 
speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.”74 The speaker identity 
gap was thus filled.  
 Doctrinally, it is important that Citizens United says that speaker 
discrimination may offend the Constitution “[q]uite apart from the 
purpose or effect of regulating content . . . .”75 As I will explore in 
more detail in the next Part of this Article, there are many different 
ways to conceive of speaker identity and why it might matter to free-
dom of expression. One perspective is that it is simply another mech-
anism by which a government might control the content of what is 
said. It may not always be possible to disentangle speech from speak-
er. But by stressing that speaker discrimination is a concern “apart 
from” content discrimination, the Court made clear that speaker dis-
crimination should be understood as an independent, standalone in-
fringement on freedom of speech, even when content discrimination 
is harder to show.76 A plaintiff trying to challenge a state policy 
should be able to achieve heightened scrutiny simply by showing that 
the state is regulating who can speak. There would be no need to 
allege or prove that the regulation was a pretext for content dis-
crimination or that it has the effect of content discrimination. The 
mere fact of discrimination based on the identity of the speaker 
would be enough.  
                                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. at 784. 
 73. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. 
 74. Id. at 341. 
 75. Id. at 340. 
 76. Id. 
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 We can see the immediate potential impact of this new develop-
ment in First Amendment law if we return to the 11th Circuit’s deci-
sion about the exclusion of non-residents from speaking at town 
meetings in Rowe v. City of Cocoa.77 In that case, the Court of Ap-
peals noted that subject matter discrimination is permissible in a 
limited public forum, though viewpoint discrimination is not.78 Since 
a residency restriction is not a viewpoint restriction, the court as-
sumed that it was permissible.79 But had this case arisen after Citi-
zens United, the analysis would have had to go farther––or at a min-
imum the Court of Appeals would have had to decide if Citizens Unit-
ed’s holding on speaker discrimination applies in a limited public fo-
rum such as a town meeting. The residency requirement is neither a 
content nor a viewpoint restriction. But it is clearly a restriction 
based on speaker identity. Under Citizens United, such a restriction 
would attract heightened scrutiny. Given that there were a number 
of other ways the town could have maintained order in its public 
meetings, the result would likely be different. 
 Precisely because the new articulation of the speaker discrimina-
tion doctrine is such an important step, there are doubts about 
whether the Court really meant what it said. In a recent essay, Pro-
fessor Michael W. McConnell dismissed the speaker discrimination 
part of Citizens United as being overly sweeping and indicated skep-
ticism about whether the Court will follow through.80 Professor 
McConnell’s main point was that Citizens United could have been 
resolved on narrower grounds.81 That may be correct, but it was not 
the path the Court chose, and it would be an error to dismiss this as-
pect of the decision. The justices in the Citizens United majority were 
offered several paths toward a narrower ruling, and they decided 
that they had to take the broader, sweeping route.82 Assuming that 
the justices in the majority do not want to be seen as acting on sub-
jective political agendas, their legal reasoning should be taken seri-
ously and the Court should be expected to apply it to other cases.83  
                                                                                                                                 
 77. Rowe v. City of Cocoa, 358 F.3d 800 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussed supra Part II). 
 78. Id. at 804.  
 79. Id. at 803-04 (“A bona fide residency requirement, as we have here, does not re-
strict speech based on a speaker’s viewpoint but instead restricts speech at meetings on the 
basis of residency.”). 
 80. McConnell, supra note 6, at 448-49 (suggesting that the Court misapplied previ-
ous precedents and that its holding could be better explained as a Press Clause decision). 
 81. Id. at 415. 
 82. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 322-26 (dismissing several proposed means by 
which the Court could hold for Citizens United but avoid a sweeping constitutional decision). 
 83. Cf. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 581, 618 (2011) (suggesting that the Court’s campaign finance decisions are doctrinal-
ly incoherent but can be explained by a “political sensibility”).  
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 Professor McConnell correctly observes that since Citizens United 
the Court has declined to strike down restrictions on non-citizen par-
ticipation in election campaigns.84 That is certainly a form of speaker 
discrimination. But the Court upheld it in a one line, per curiam af-
firmance of a Court of Appeals decision that analyzed the case under 
strict scrutiny. Thus, at least doctrinally, the Court was not confront-
ed with a case that conflicted with what should happen under Citizen 
United’s speaker discrimination holding.85 The discrimination against 
non-citizens deserved new and closer scrutiny. But it would go too far 
to suggest that this limited post-Citizens United engagement with 
the issue indicates that the Court is backing away from its doctrinal 
holding regarding speaker discrimination.  
 The best way to put to rest doubts about speaker discrimination in 
Citizens United is to show that this doctrine has broader merit and 
was not merely a results-oriented means to an end for justices who 
wanted to strike down restrictions on corporate involvement in elec-
tion campaigns. In the next Part, I will explain why speaker identity 
matters to expression and why it thus deserves special protection 
under the First Amendment. In Part 0, I will show that while Citi-
zens United articulated the speaker discrimination doctrine in newly 
clear terms, the underlying principle was evident in older First 
Amendment cases. It is thus wrong to criticize this aspect of Citizens 
United for breaking away from established free speech jurisprudence. 
B.   The Citizens United Dissent 
 If one wants to find evidence that the speaker discrimination hold-
ing in Citizens United broke entirely new doctrinal ground, one needs 
look no farther than the reaction of the four dissenting justices. In-
deed, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor found much 
to object to in the Citizens United judgment. They believed the Court 
had violated principles of judicial restraint by deciding the case on 
broad grounds and by addressing the free speech rights of for-profit 
corporations, since Citizens United was actually a non-profit organi-
zation.86 And they objected to the equation of corporate speech with 
speech by people. Even if they had conceded the speaker discrimina-
                                                                                                                                 
 84. McConnell, supra note 6, at 448 (citing Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012) 
(per curiam)). 
 85. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir 2011) (deciding that the regu-
lation could survive strict scrutiny and thus that it was unnecessary to determine which 
level of scrutiny applied), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012). Curiously, the D.C. Circuit’s deci-
sion in Bluman relied heavily on the Citizens United dissent while skirting the speaker 
discrimination issue that emerges from the majority’s decision. Id. at 289. There are rea-
sons to believe that the Court needs to re-visit the issue of non-citizen speech rights. See 
discussion infra Part VII. 
 86. 558 U.S. at 319. 
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tion issue, there are solid grounds on which to dissent from the ma-
jority on the campaign finance questions. Speech can be restricted if 
the regulation is tailored to fit a valid government interest.87 Such a 
case can be made for campaign finance regulation.88 One could also 
contest the equation of corporate speech with individual speech in the 
electioneering context.89  
 Kathleen Sullivan has written that the real debate between the 
majority and dissent in Citizens United is a clash between libertarian 
conceptions of free speech (the majority) and an egalitarian approach 
that ultimately values political equality over complete freedom of 
speech.90 She writes that Justice Stevens’ egalitarian view: 
has both an antidiscrimination component and an affirmative ac-
tion component. The former bars government from discriminating 
against marginal, dissident, or unpopular viewpoints that are like-
ly to suffer political subordination or hostility. The latter enforces 
a kind of preference or forced subsidy for marginal, dissident, or 
unpopular viewpoints by barring the attachment of speech-
restrictive conditions to the receipt of public benefits.91  
 This certainly can explain the contrasting views on the Court on the 
question of campaign finance regulation. It goes particularly to the de-
bate over whether the government may restrict corporate speech to 
prevent the “distorting effects of immense aggregations of 
wealth . . . .”92 Overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,93 
the majority rejected the egalitarian approach, arguing that the gov-
ernment has no constitutional role “ ‘in equalizing the relative ability 
of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.’ ”94  
 This debate became even more central in 2014’s McCutcheon v. 
FEC, where the same five-justice majority struck down aggregate 
caps on individual campaign donations.95 While Citizens United re-
jected the proposed government’s interest in preventing the distor-
tion of national political debate through unfettered corporate spend-
ing, McCutcheon focused more on the fear that direct campaign dona-
                                                                                                                                 
 87. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1456 (2014) (explaining the similarity of 
strict scrutiny and the “closely drawn” test). 
 88. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 452-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 89. See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech 
and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 495, 497 (2011). 
 90. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 
146-48 (2010). 
 91. Id. at 148. 
 92. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
 93. Id. at 669. 
 94. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349-50 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976)), with id. at 441-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 95. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014). 
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tions carry the danger of corruption. The Court in McCutcheon lim-
ited this government interest to quid pro quo bribery.96 The dissent in 
McCutcheon, per Justice Breyer, saw the danger of corruption in 
broad terms.97 But in both cases, the dissenters’ central concern was 
that average Americans will be pushed out of political life because 
they will not have the required monetary resources to be heard: 
“Where enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be 
heard.”98 
 However, the antidiscrimination or egalitarian approach to free 
speech is difficult to square with the dissenters’ reluctance to prohibit 
speaker discrimination in Citizens United. The dissenters in Citizens 
United were explicitly willing to permit speech restrictions against a 
variety of less wealthy segments of the general public—students, 
noncitizens, prisoners, government employees, non-citizens, enlisted 
soldiers. They wrote: 
The Government routinely places special restrictions on the speech 
rights of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, for-
eigners, and its own employees. When such restrictions are justi-
fied by a legitimate governmental interest, they do not necessarily 
raise constitutional problems. In contrast to the blanket rule that 
the majority espouses, our cases recognize that the Government’s 
interests may be more or less compelling with respect to different 
classes of speakers, and that the constitutional rights of certain 
categories of speakers, in certain contexts, “ ‘are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights’ ” that are normally accorded to mem-
bers of our society.99 
 There is reason to be surprised that none of the four dissenters 
saw more value in the speaker discrimination portion of Justice Ken-
nedy’s opinion.100 Justice Kennedy sought to put speaker discrimina-
tion in the context of the repression of “disadvantaged per-
son[s] . . . .”101 Advocates of campaign finance regulation would seem 
to have a similar concern. One could imagine an elegant dissent that 
embraced Kennedy’s desire for an inclusive national discourse, but 
then took him to task for not grasping how unrestrained money in 
                                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. at 1441. 
 97. Id. at 1466-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he anticorruption interest that drives 
Congress to regulate campaign contributions is a far broader, more important interest than 
the plurality acknowledges. It is an interest in maintaining the integrity of our public gov-
ernmental institutions.”).  
 98. Id. at 1467. 
 99. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 420-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 396-97, 404 (2007)). 
 100. One reason to be surprised by this Part of the dissent is that Justice Stevens had 
appeared to endorse the opposite view in Los Angeles Police Department. See discussion 
infra Part 0. 
 101. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340-41. 
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politics drowns out these voices and degrades the worth and standing 
of Americans who may have something to say but less wealth with 
which to broadcast it. But that is not the path the dissenters chose. 
 With Justice Stevens writing, they recognized correctly that the 
speaker discrimination principle was the “basic premise” for the ma-
jority’s reasoning.102 They sharply contested the validity of this prem-
ise, just as they attacked the better known parts of the majority deci-
sion. We need to wonder why they disputed this and if they were on 
solid ground. The dissenters hinted that speaker discrimination may 
have some place in free speech doctrine (but in very hedged terms). 
They noted that, while the First Amendment “frowned on” speaker 
discrimination, it did not prohibit all such distinctions.103 But they 
then rejected the majority’s version of the speaker discrimination 
principle in sweeping, sharp terms:  
 The basic premise underlying the Court's ruling is its iteration, 
and constant reiteration, of the proposition that the First Amend-
ment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker’s identity, in-
cluding its “identity” as a corporation. While that glittering gener-
ality has rhetorical appeal, it is not a correct statement of the law.  
 . . . . 
 . . . Like its paeans to unfettered discourse, the Court’s denun-
ciation of identity-based distinctions may have rhetorical appeal 
but it obscures reality.104  
 Endorsing restrictions on the expressive rights of civil servants, 
soldiers and students is clearly in tension with the idea that average 
people should not take a back seat in political life. But it stems from 
a longstanding problem in First Amendment law. The dissent con-
flates forum-based speech restrictions with speaker-based re-
strictions. Although the dissent claimed that elections were different, 
Justice Stevens’ opinion asserted that speech restrictions based on 
identity are constitutionally permissible in a number of non-election 
contexts, such as those involving students, prisoners, soldiers, and 
civil servants.105 For such people, the dissent said, “The Government 
routinely places special restrictions on [] speech rights. . . .”106 
 The dissent accomplishes this through a shift in phrasing rather 
than fully articulated logic. For instance, Justice Stevens cited in a 
footnote the Bethel School District case,107 where the Court said that 
                                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. at 394 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 422-23. 
 104. Id. at 394, 420. 
 105. Id. at 420. 
 106. Id.  
 107. See id. at 420 n.41. 
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“the constitutional rights of students in public school are not auto-
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”108 
But in the Citizens United dissent, Justice Stevens said “[t]he Gov-
ernment routinely places special restrictions on the speech rights of 
students . . . .”109 As we will see in more detail in Part 0, the Court has 
indeed endorsed speech restrictions in the school context, but it has 
not endorsed general limits on the right of students to speak freely. 
By dropping the context, the Citizens United dissent makes a very 
different and vastly broader claim about the power of the state to 
limit speech. 
 The dissent promotes a similarly broad reading of other forum-
based cases. For example, in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ La-
bor Union, Inc., the Court affirmed the authority of prison officials to 
prevent inmates from organizing a quasi-union to promote better 
working conditions in the prison. In that case, the Court’s rationale 
was based entirely on the exigencies of operating a prison:  
The fact of confinement and the needs of the penal institution im-
pose limitations on constitutional rights, including those derived 
from the First Amendment, which are implicit in incarceration. 
 . . . . 
 . . . In a prison context, an inmate does not retain those First 
Amendment rights that are “inconsistent with his status as a pris-
oner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections 
system.”110  
The justices in Jones gave no indication that they would have ap-
proved of restrictions on communication outside prison about prison 
conditions. In fact, they stressed that the prison authorities were not 
preventing inmates from communicating with the outside world.111 
Yet, in Citizens United the dissent asserts that the Court has broadly 
endorsed limits on the speech of prisoners, again without reference to 
the context.112 
 The dissent thus illustrates an important problem with forum doc-
trine. Even when it is clear that the government can legitimately re-
strict speech in a certain context, we need a limiting principle by 
which to contain these restrictions. As we can see in the slippage of 
language in the dissent, there is a danger that once speech re-
                                                                                                                                 
 108. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 109. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 110. Jones v. N.C. Prisoner’s Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125, 129 (1977) (quoting Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). 
 111. Id. at 131 (noting that limitations on bulk mailing were reasonable under the 
First Amendment because “other avenues of outside informational flow by the Union re-
main[ed] available” to communicate with prisoners). 
 112. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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strictions are approved in one context, the speech restrictions can 
begin to follow the people, rather than remain tethered to the context 
where they were originally justified. Thus a restriction on speech in 
school can morph into a limitation on the speech rights of students at 
all times and in all places. I will revisit some of these speech settings 
in Part 0. I argue that an immediate benefit of the speaker discrimi-
nation doctrine is that it can provide the necessary limiting principle 
to prevent forum doctrine from swallowing the speech rights of whole 
classes of people. 
 However, before addressing this potential application of the 
speaker discrimination doctrine, I will address two other issues. In 
Part 0, I will make the case that there is good reason for free speech 
doctrine to be concerned about speaker identity, not only content and 
viewpoint. In Part 0, I will argue that Citizens United did not really 
invent an entirely new principle of law. Instead, a suspicion of speak-
er discrimination has long been part of free speech law, but it had not 
previously been so explicitly explained by the Court.  
V.   WHY DOES SPEAKER IDENTITY MATTER? 
A.   Beyond the Marketplace of Ideas  
 To understand how the Court came to recently recognize speaker 
identity as an important component of speech, it is important to first 
summarize the complexity that the Court has long encountered in 
trying to articulate the value of free expression generally. The ques-
tion of whether speaker discrimination is a free expression problem 
depends on why we protect free expression to begin with. Yet, as a 
leading treatise summarizes, “[c]ontemporary free speech jurispru-
dence is a befuddling array of theories, methods, formulas, tests, doc-
trines and subject areas.”113 As I will now endeavor to show, some 
theories of free speech explain the broad sweep of the Free Speech 
Clause better than others. The most commonplace justification for 
free speech, the so-called marketplace of ideas, appears particularly 
inadequate to the task. But other theories, such as the liber-
ty/autonomy theory of speech or the agency theory seem to come 
much closer to the majority’s approach in Citizens United. 
 The classic American explanation for the purpose of free speech is 
the marketplace of ideas, often traced to Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 
1919 dissent in Abrams v. U.S.:114 
                                                                                                                                 
 113. SMOLLA, supra note 11, § 2:2. 
 114. SMOLLA, supra note 11, § 2:4 (“The marketplace theory is perhaps the most fa-
mous and rhetorically resonant of all free speech theories, though it has often been at-
tacked by modern scholars.”). 
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[M]en have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very founda-
tions of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better 
reached by free trade in ideas––that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market . . . .115 
The idea that free speech promotes competition for the best ideas 
resonates across a wide range of arenas, from our adversarial sys-
tem of justice to the rigorous testing of scientific theories in aca-
demic research.116 The marketplace rationale is sufficient to explain 
the philosophical opposition to censorship and to defend the basic 
right of citizens to critique their political leaders.117 It also explains 
cases where the Court has recognized the right of the public to re-
ceive information.118 It explains the unique American permissive-
ness toward hate speech, an issue on which the United States parts 
ways with other western democracies and with international hu-
man rights law.119  
 As Professor Cass Sunstein observed two decades ago, Holmes’ 
conception of the market stemmed from two ideas that were always 
in tension with another. On the one hand, the marketplace of ideas 
promises to produce a better understanding of truth through testing 
and debate, even though Holmes’s expressed “skepticism about pre-
vailing understandings of truth” and thus doubted whether there was 
always an objective truth to be discovered.120 The marketplace meta-
phor implies that there is some truth or an objectively better idea 
that will be identified through competition. It is easiest to apply to 
the contest of articulable ideas, to matters of debate, where messages 
are clashing with each other.121 It does not easily encompass expres-
                                                                                                                                 
 115. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
 116. See CHRIS DEMASKE, MODERN POWER AND FREE SPEECH 29-52 (2009) (providing 
that the Supreme Court has used the marketplace metaphor in a wide variety of speech 
contexts over many decades of jurisprudence). 
 117. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 
25 (1993). 
 118. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 762-65 (1976) (striking down restrictions on information that could be distributed 
by pharmacists).  
 119. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (citing the “specter that the 
Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace’ ” to 
strike down a hate speech statute (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. 
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))); see also International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights art. 20(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 
Mar. 23, 1976) (“Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes in-
citement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”).  
 120. SUNSTEIN, supra note 117, at 25. 
 121. Cf. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392 (“One must wholeheartedly agree with the Minnesota 
Supreme Court that ‘[i]t is the responsibility, even the obligation, of diverse communities to 
confront such notions in whatever form they appear,’ but the manner of that confrontation 
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sion that does not directly clash with some other expression, or that 
does not clearly articulate a message at all. The marketplace meta-
phor is especially hard to apply to expression that has no clearly ar-
ticulable content. How can the marketplace for ideas include expres-
sion that does not clearly express any clearly identifiable idea? Per-
haps a bad ideology like racism can be countered by an effectively 
communicated good idea, like tolerance. But can bad art be remedied 
by good art? Can a bad song be corrected by playing a better one? 
 As Professor David A. J. Richards taught, the idea that truth will 
be found through the contest of ideas may be an unstable foundation 
for the expansive protection of free expression that we have come to 
take for granted in the United States.122 Richards observed that the 
scope of desired debate can be defined narrowly or broadly, and if the 
aim of free speech is to produce a fair debate that will yield the best 
ideas, then there might be a need for government intervention to 
keep the debate focused.123 Richards’ point is that many of the situa-
tions that seem to best epitomize the adversarial testing of ideas in 
fact involve considerable regulation of speech, such as courtrooms or 
parliaments where expression can be limited if it strays from exter-
nally imposed rules of order.124 Rather than keep government out of 
the speech regulation, a devotion to the marketplace of ideas may 
actually call for heavy government regulation of speech, to keep the 
debate within bounds, much as a judge keeps order in a courtroom. 
But the American concept of free speech rejects such a role for gov-
ernment in public fora, even if it means allowing speech that actually 
aims to thwart democracy or hinder the search for truth.125  
 As the Supreme Court itself has noted on occasion, a strict and 
direct application of the marketplace metaphor might lead to a fair 
degree of repression of any speech that seems not to directly contrib-
ute to the competitive marketplace of ideas. The Court observed this 
problem with reference to abstract art in Hurley v. Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston: “[A] narrow, succinctly 
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, 
which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ 
                                                                                                                                 
cannot consist of selective limitations upon speech. . . . The point of the First Amendment 
is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech 
on the basis of its content.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 
N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 1991)) (citations omitted)). 
 122. DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, FREE SPEECH AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 18-22 (1999). 
 123. Id. at 20. 
 124. See id. at 20-22. 
 125. See id. at 20 (“If such attacks should be protected, as current American law indeed 
requires, it seems rather strained to justify such protection on the ground that it invariably 
advances democracy when the speech it allows may sometimes self-consciously aim to sub-
vert it. We value such speech intrinsically, certainly not because it always advances demo-
cratically determined policies and aims.”).  
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would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson 
Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis 
Carroll.”126 This remark is interesting in two respects. First, the 
Court (per Justice Souter) considered art to be “unquestionably” pro-
tected by the First Amendment, and yet, he did not (or could not) ar-
ticulate exactly why this should be so.127  
 Second, it is interesting that the Court brought up Jackson Pol-
lock in a case concerning a parade. In Hurley, the Court held that it 
would violate parade organizers’ free speech rights to force them to 
include gay, lesbian, and transgender participants.128 Parades seem 
like a fairly conventional form of political communication, but the 
Court actually found it difficult––and in the end unnecessary––to pin 
down a single discernable message from the parade.129 The organizers 
of a parade may choose to include a wide array of participants, each 
with different specific messages, but which together may neverthe-
less communicate something, “[r]ather like a composer” writing a 
score for an orchestra.130  
 While the marketplace of ideas focuses on political debates as the 
most obviously protected form of expression, in Hurley the Court 
found that it was easier to understand painting and music as a form 
of free speech, and to protect political speech by analogy.131 To be pro-
tected by the First Amendment, speech need not be valued only for 
its explicit content. Andy Warhol’s Campbell’s soup paintings are 
probably not, literally, just about soup. Sometimes, the most im-
portant aspects of communication are nuanced and difficult to articu-
late, but they can still be protected by the First Amendment. The ab-
stractions of art proved useful to explain the nuances of political ex-
pression rather than the other way around. This suggests that the 
marketplace of ideas may not be as central to freedom of speech as 
often imagined. 
 The marketplace of ideas as it has been applied seems to begin 
and end with the regulation of content and viewpoint. Despite its fre-
quent repetition and intrinsic appeal, the marketplace metaphor is 
not especially helpful for understanding the full breadth of free 
speech, and especially not the doctrine of speaker discrimination. 
Professor Richards suggests that improving democratic debates may 
actually be a secondary benefit of free speech, but not its primary ra-
                                                                                                                                 
 126. 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (citation omitted). 
 127. See generally Tushnet, supra note 63. 
 128. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557, 574. 
 129. Id. at 574. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. 
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tionale.132 This is a critical insight to be able to understand the Su-
preme Court’s new announcement of a ban on speaker discrimina-
tion. If all we are interested in is a contest of ideas, who expresses 
the ideas would not seem especially important.  
B.   Diversity and Autonomy 
 Another famous Supreme Court rationale for broad protection of 
free speech is Justice Brandeis’ opinion in Whitney v. California, 
where he argued that the remedy to bad speech is more speech: 
 Those who won our independence by revolution were not cow-
ards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at 
the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence 
in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the 
processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech 
can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil 
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is op-
portunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through 
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the pro-
cesses of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not 
enforced silence.133  
On the surface, the more speech rationale seems to be just another 
version of the marketplace of ideas. Brandeis clung to the idea that 
free debate will permit the best ideas to prevail when arguments can 
be tested by counterargument.134 But the idea that we should encour-
age more speech potentially goes farther than the marketplace of 
ideas metaphor.  
 The idea that more speech is a good thing can encompass the prin-
ciple that allowing more voices to be heard is a good in and of itself, 
even if it does not always yield objective truth. The actual nature of 
political debate suggests that it is not always possible for the public 
to reach a consensus. Political struggles are rarely won the way liti-
gation can be closed through res judicata; some debates simmer end-
lessly and with intensity. In a democracy, people with irreconcilable 
ideologies must coexist with neither side necessarily winning once 
and for all.135 In this respect, clashing ideas about public policy are 
not necessarily so different from clashing conceptions about what 
                                                                                                                                 
 132. See RICHARDS, supra note 122, at 21. 
 133. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 134. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 117, at 26-28 (comparing the arguments of Holmes and 
Brandeis). 
 135. For instance, the Supreme Court has recently taken note of ongoing, unresolved 
public debate concerning affirmative action. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative 
Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630 (2014). Other potential examples might include public de-
bates over abortion, the size and role of government in the economy, the wisdom of higher 
taxes on the wealthy, and immigration policy.  
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makes good art. Clashing perspectives must coexist, just as clashing 
tastes in art and music must coexist.  
 In a diverse society, more speech may just lead to more speech, and 
that may be good enough. Rather than a marketplace where the best 
idea wins out, the First Amendment may exist to promote diversity in 
expression in which there need not be a definitive victor, nor even di-
rect competition. Being open to more speech means that more speakers 
have an outlet through which to express themselves, and more people 
can find the kind of speech they want to hear. Allowing all such voices 
to express themselves offers an outlet by which the equal value of all 
may be acknowledged, and by which some resulting tension between 
people who have different preferences may be relieved. 
 The Supreme Court raised the issue of diversity directly in Cohen 
v. California, a case concerning a man who insisted that the First 
Amendment protected his right to wear a jacket emblazoned with the 
slogan “Fuck the Draft” into a courthouse.136 He was prosecuted for 
“offensive conduct.”137 California argued that this was not really con-
tent discrimination because Mr. Cohen could have found a more po-
lite turn of phrase by which to communicate his displeasure with mil-
itary conscription.138 In a narrow view of the marketplace of ideas 
metaphor, this is a plausible argument. But the Court understood 
that there was more to Mr. Cohen’s jacket than simply communi-
cating a concrete political viewpoint. 
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: 
it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached ex-
plication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. . . . We 
cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of 
the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard 
for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be 
the more important element of the overall message . . . .139 
The principle that free speech includes inexpressible elements as well 
as articulated ideas is critical to finding a rationale for free speech 
beyond the marketplace of ideas. 
 Professor C. Edwin Baker argued that the First Amendment pro-
tects “not a marketplace, but rather an arena of individual liberty.”140 
                                                                                                                                 
 136. 403 U.S. 15, 15 (1971). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992) (“But ‘fighting words’ 
that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender—aspersions upon a 
person’s mother, for example—would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of 
those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance and equality, but could not be used by 
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to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”). 
 139. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. 
 140. C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 5 (1989). 
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Cohen embraces this view. Cohen is often quoted for the line, “[O]ne 
man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”141 But behind this one-liner, the 
Cohen decision managed to articulate a vision of free speech linked 
directly to the diversity of American society: 
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in 
a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and in-
tended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public 
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced 
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such 
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more 
perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would com-
port with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which 
our political system rests.142 
Combined with the recognition that people have different tastes, the 
Court’s desire to place the decision about what should be expressed 
“into the hands of each of us” necessarily means there will be a wide 
range of views expressed.143 It allows people to express themselves for 
their own personal benefit, not just to contribute to public debate. As 
Professor Sunstein wrote: “There is also an important connection be-
tween free speech and individual self-development. The opportunity 
to create art or literature, like the opportunity to read the products of 
other minds, is crucial to the development of human capacities.”144 
Expanding on this idea, Professor Richards argues that free speech is 
an outgrowth of each person’s right to moral independence.145 He 
calls this the “[t]oleration [m]odel” of free speech, rooted in the Con-
stitution’s embrace of freedom of conscience.146  
 The marketplace of ideas and the other rationales for free speech 
are not mutually exclusive. As Thomas Emerson wrote in the early 
1960s, together they all help to justify the expansive concept of free 
expression that we have in the United States.147 These background 
ideas provide a foundation from which to understand the value of 
speaker identity. Free speech is about more than just literal content.  
                                                                                                                                 
 141. 403 U.S. at 25. 
 142. Id. at 24. 
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 144. SUNSTEIN, supra note 117, at 129-30. 
 145. RICHARDS, supra note 122, at 21. 
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C.   Content Versus Voice 
 In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy’s opinion offers two main ex-
planations for why a prohibition on speaker discrimination must flow 
from the First Amendment.148 The first is that “[s]peech restrictions 
based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means 
to control content.”149 The second was this: “By taking the right to 
speak from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives 
the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive 
to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice.”150 I 
will take each of these ideas in turn. 
 The premise that control of who may speak will permit the gov-
ernment to control the content of what is said ties the speaker dis-
crimination principle directly to the marketplace of ideas theory of 
free speech. This puts speaker discrimination on firm doctrinal 
ground, since content discrimination has proven to be a solid and 
fairly workable pillar of free speech doctrine over decades of test-
ing.151 This rationale addresses the March on Washington hypothet-
ical that I raised regarding the speaker list wherein the government 
could have developed a manipulative restriction on younger speakers 
in order to keep more threatening viewpoints at bay.152  
 But the connection between speaker and content is not simple. We 
know that there are correlations between various markers of identity 
and political opinions. For instance, churchgoers appear much more 
likely to vote for Republican candidates, while unmarried voters fa-
vor Democrats.153 Thus, if the government were able to reduce the 
ability of certain kinds of people to express themselves, it could tilt 
public debate in one direction or another. At the macro-level, it seems 
logical that preferring certain speakers over others would impact the 
overall mix of viewpoints that are heard. But this logic may not be as 
convincing at the level of an individual speaker or an individual case. 
Polling data may show convincingly that, on average, identity mark-
ers such as religion, race, income, and marital status predict political 
orientation, but this is more useful in understanding voting patterns 
of large numbers of people than the opinions that individuals might 
express.  
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 Resting solely on the correlation between identity and content 
could lead in problematic directions. There are plenty of people who 
break from the pack of their demographic categories in forming their 
opinions. It would seem that freedom of speech should exist in part to 
facilitate opinions that are unconventional or surprising. By analogy, 
in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court recognized that diversity in higher 
education is not strictly about ensuring that there are minority stu-
dents present to “express some characteristic minority viewpoint on 
any issue.”154 By the same token, it would be problematic to justify 
preventing speaker discrimination simply so that individuals can be 
spokesmen for their presumed demographic identity.  
 Critical legal theorists have had to puzzle with this dilemma, 
since they have pushed for the inclusion of a wider diversity of voices 
in public life, especially from people at the bottom of racial, gender, 
and economic hierarchies. Yet, as Devon Carbado noted more than a 
decade ago in a thoughtful essay on this problem, “although the peo-
ple on the bottom speak in a different voice, that voice in not mono-
lithic.”155 This raises the question of whether there is a particular 
viewpoint that needs to be expressed, or if the value of including 
more voices is more than the mere content of what they might say. 
For instance, is it possible to advocate the inclusion of women in pub-
lic debate without resorting to a kind of essentialism by implying 
that there is a single women’s experience that a woman is likely to 
communicate?156  
 One answer to this is that a substantive message can come across 
differently depending on who the messenger is. In fact, one can send 
a message simply by selecting certain people as representatives, even 
if they do not necessarily say anything at all.157 The point here is less 
about the speaker and the message than about the listener and the 
way the message is received. Consider as an example two prominent 
abolitionists from the Civil War era, Frederick Douglass and Thad-
deus Stevens. One of them was an escaped slave, an African-
American. The other was a white congressional leader. In substance, 
they were largely on the same side of major debates of their day, but 
it would be very wrong to think that they were interchangeable. In 
terms of persuasion, their different identities could give a different 
                                                                                                                                 
 154. 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
 155. Devon W. Carbado, Race to the Bottom, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1283, 1298 (2002). 
 156. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 581, 588 (1990). 
 157. Consider, for instance, the decision by President Obama to name gay athletes to 
the American delegation at the Sochi Olympics, which was understood as a statement 
against Russian repression against the LGBT community. See Cindy Boren, Obama Names 
Openly Gay Athletes to Sochi Olympic Delegation, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/early-lead/wp/2013/12/18/obama-names-openly-gay-
athletes-to-sochi-olympic-delegation/.  
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kind of potency to what they said, which could change in different 
contexts.  
 Stevens may have drawn legitimacy from the fact that he was 
white and from the elite, which may have made him more persuasive 
in some quarters. Psychological research has shown that values-
based political messages are more likely to be persuasive to listeners 
if the listener perceives that the speaker has shared values or politi-
cal backgrounds.158 By contrast, Douglass could draw on the fact that 
when he spoke of slavery, even if he spoke in general or abstract 
terms, listeners would know that he was drawing from lived experi-
ence. Minority speakers are often seen as possessing “authenticity” or 
“credibility” when they speak on issues relevant to minorities.159 This 
does not mean that they really can claim to speak more legitimately, 
that their ideas are necessarily better, or that there is a single au-
thentic minority experience to communicate anyway. But what they 
say may nevertheless be received differently.160  
 The Court has directly wrestled with the question of whether 
speaker identity changes the communicative meaning of speech in 
City of Ladue, where the Court struck down a municipal restriction 
on homeowners’ rights to post political signs outside their houses.161 
The city argued that residents have adequate other channels by 
which to communicate their political opinion.162 But the Court reject-
ed this because of the connection between speech and the identity of 
the speaker:   
Displaying a sign from one’s own residence often carries a message 
quite distinct from placing the same sign someplace else . . . . Pre-
cisely because of their location, such signs provide information 
about the identity of the “speaker.” . . . A sign advocating “Peace in 
the Gulf” in the front lawn of a retired general or decorated war 
veteran may provoke a different reaction than the same sign in a 
10-year-old child’s bedroom window or the same message on a 
bumper sticker of a passing automobile. An espousal of socialism 
may carry different implications when displayed on the grounds of 
                                                                                                                                 
 158. See Thomas E. Nelson & Jennifer Garst, Values-Based Political Messages and 
Persuasion: Relationships Among Speaker, Recipient, and Evoked Values, 26 POL. 
PSYCHOL. 489 (2005). 
 159. See Carbado, supra note 155, at 1299-1304. 
 160. In recent popular culture, the gap between perceived voice and actual perspective 
was dramatized in a 2014 episode of Mad Men, where in the context of a late-1960s adver-
tising agency, some male executives promoted the work of a female colleague because she 
would be seen as representing “the voice of moms,” even though she was single and child-
less and her work was high quality and the product of a collaboration with many male 
colleagues. See Mad Men: Waterloo (AMC television broadcast May 25, 2014). 
 161. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 46 (1994). 
 162. Id. at 56. 
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a stately mansion than when pasted on a factory wall or an ambu-
latory sandwich board.163 
 The recognition that speaker identity matters to the meaning of 
speech connects closely to the right to engage in anonymous speech. 
If the speaker’s identity is actually itself a form of community, can a 
speaker decide to hide his or her identity so as to change that mes-
sage? In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Supreme Court 
said “an author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions 
concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is 
an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amend-
ment.”164 The Court has repeatedly held that states may not require 
people to announce their identities to the government or even wear 
identification badges when they engage in expressive activities such 
as distribute leaflets or canvas door-to-door.165 One reason for protect-
ing anonymous speech is to encourage more speech, because many 
people may feel intimidated into silence otherwise.166 This concern is 
evident in NAACP v. Button, which protected the right of civil rights 
organizations in the Jim Crow South to keep their membership rolls 
secret.167 But another reason is that content and speaker identity are 
closely linked, so that if speakers were required to reveal their identi-
ties, the government would be exercising a kind of editorial control.168 
 The connection between speaker identity and expressive content 
can be seen even more clearly in the Court’s willingness to protect 
the right to assume false identities. In McIntyre, the Court said “an 
author generally is free to decide whether or not to disclose his or her 
true identity.”169 The free speech value of lying about one’s identity 
varies considerably. In United States v. Alvarez, where the Court 
struck down the Stolen Valor Act on free speech grounds, the defend-
ant had falsely claimed to have been a marine while speaking at a 
public meeting.170 Mr. Alvarez’s lie was a “pathetic attempt to gain 
                                                                                                                                 
 163. Id. at 56-57 (also citing Aristotle for the proposition that speaker identity may 
enhance or deplete the persuasive power of the message). 
 164. 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).  
 165. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
168 (2002) (striking down an ordinance requiring a permit in order to engage in door-to-
door canvasing); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 204 (1999) 
(holding that a measure that requires people who are collecting petition signatures to wear 
identity badges violates the First Amendment); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) 
(holding that an ordinance that bans anonymous leafleting violates the First Amendment).  
 166. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and 
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1542 (2007). 
 167. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 442-44 (1963). 
 168. Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 166, at 1543. 
 169. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341. 
 170. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012). But see United States v. 
Chappell, 691 F.3d 388, 399-400 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that the First Amendment does 
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respect,” since honor and respect flow from military service.171 But by 
defending Mr. Alvarez’s right to lie, the Court also offers protection to 
more sympathetic speakers. Consider, for instance, John Howard 
Griffin’s 1976 book Black Like Me, in which a white author records 
his experience living for six weeks as a black man, in an effort to 
highlight the impact of race in American life. More recently, a group 
of online journalists conducted an experiment by posting political 
comments on Internet discussion sites with false photographs of 
themselves in which they purported to have a different race or gen-
der. They then recorded how their postings were received differently 
depending on who readers thought they were––illustrating vividly 
the relevance that speaker identity has for the way speech is 
received.172 
 It should be noted that the Court has cut back on anonymous or 
false identity speech in the context of campaign finance, suggesting 
that the right to anonymous speech may be context-specific.173 In Cit-
izens United, the Court reaffirmed its previous decisions that dis-
claimer and disclosure requirements are permissible in campaign 
finance regulation.174 The Court found that such regulations must be 
subject to “exacting scrutiny,” but they do not ultimately prevent an-
yone from speaking and serve the purpose of providing more infor-
mation to the public.175 Although this appears to be an exception 
unique to electioneering, it is clearly in tension with cases like McIn-
tyre, NAACP, and Watchtower Bible, where the Court worried that re-
quiring disclosure of speakers’ identities could have a silencing effect.  
D.   Speech and Dignity 
 Perhaps the most surprising part of Citizens United is the majori-
ty’s strong assertion that excluding a person or group of people from 
the right to speak “deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the 
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect 
for the speaker’s voice.”176 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion ap-
pears in this passage to recognize that the right to speak is a marker 
                                                                                                                                 
not invalidate prosecution for impersonating a police officer because of the closer nexus to 
fraud or criminal activity). 
 171. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542. 
 172. PJ Vogt & Alex Goldman, [TLDR the internet, shorter] #31 – Race Swap, 
ONTHEMEDIA.COM (July 17, 2014, 3:35 PM), http://www.onthemedia.org/story/31-race-
swap-experiment/. 
 173. See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 166, at 1547-50 (describing conflicting case law 
about anonymous speech, especially in campaign finance contexts). 
 174. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010) (“The Government may regulate 
corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not 
suppress that speech altogether.”). 
 175. Id. at 366-67 (reaffirming the decisions in Buckley v. Valeo and McConnell v. FEC). 
 176. Id. at 340-41. 
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of standing in society, possibly analogous in legal terms to the right 
to sue and be sued and the right to be heard, or more to the point, to 
the right to be recognized as a person.177  
 The concept that disadvantaged people have a unique voice has 
long been a theme in critical race theory.178 Ensuring that these voic-
es can be heard sends an important message that they are valuable. 
For instance, Carbado explained the value of hearing voices from the 
bottom of American racial hierarchies in terms very similar to Jus-
tice Kennedy’s words: “Importantly, the concern about voice can but 
need not be about what is being said. The fundamental issue is 
whether the races on the bottom have the opportunity both to speak 
and to be heard, that is to say, to participate in the production of 
knowledge.”179  
 Justice Kennedy’s idea that speech can help establish social stand-
ing connects to the theory that expression can be a means by which 
marginalized people acquire a measure of agency or power. Feminist 
writers have noted that focusing on male dominance over women often 
portrays women simply as passive victims.180 Instead, women can be 
described as having “partial agency” over their lives, even if they exist 
in an environment that favors men.181 Women and minorities are often 
relatively powerless but not entirely powerless in political, economic, 
and social life.182 Professor Chris Demaske has used this idea to argue 
that free speech can promote equality by giving otherwise powerless 
people a measure of agency.183 The ability to express oneself facilitates 
interactions through which power differences may be negotiated.184 
This does not mean that social hierarchies will be easily dismantled, 
but it offers oppressed people a measure of influence.185  
 Citizens United is explicit that speaker discrimination “need not 
be about what is being said.”186 The opinion stresses more ephemeral 
                                                                                                                                 
 177. Cf. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights 
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 566-67 (1984) (analogizing the importance of scholars of 
color writing about civil rights to establishing standing and the real party in interest in 
civil procedure). 
 178. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Mat-
ter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 95-96 (1990); Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Princi-
pled Approach to the Quest for Racial Diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5, 
10 (2004) (discussing the importance of having a “voice of color” on the federal bench).  
 179. Carbado, supra note 155, at 1305. 
 180. Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 326-27 (1995). 
 181. Id. at 354-55. 
 182. DEMASKE, supra note 116, at 68. 
 183. See id. at 74-79. 
 184. Id. at 68. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Carbado, supra note 155, at 1305. 
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ideas, like worth and respect. Here, Citizens United builds on the 
Court’s earlier recognition that there are inexpressible aspects of free 
speech. It also means, for the first time, that the Supreme Court 
managed to articulate a vision of free speech close to what Norman 
Rockwell illustrated during World War II. When the working class 
man in that picture stands to speak, we do not need to know what he 
wants to say. We simply need to see that by being allowed to speak, 
he is able to claim standing and respect in society. His right to have a 
voice is protected by the Constitution, now explicitly recognized by 
the Supreme Court.  
VI.   SPEAKER DISCRIMINATION’S EARLY, 
MISUNDERSTOOD BIRTH 
 Long before Citizens United, commentators had noted that the 
Court’s free speech case law indicated a skepticism toward any policy 
that called on the government to distinguish one kind of speaker or 
institution from another.187 Yet, the only precedent that the Citizens 
United majority provided for the speaker discrimination principle 
was First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, a 1978 case that also 
involved election-related restrictions on speech by corporations.188 
The Bellotti analogy obscures the potential reach of the speaker dis-
crimination principle and invites an unfortunate degree of cynicism. 
Because both Citizens United and Bellotti expanded the speech rights 
of corporations, some readers may have difficulty taking at face value 
the Court’s professed concern for the voice of the “disadvantaged.”  
 Nevertheless, despite the limited citations provided by the majori-
ty, the origins of the speaker discrimination principle can be traced to 
several other cases involving speech by flesh and blood human be-
ings. One clear foundation for the speaker discrimination doctrine is 
the City of Ladue decision (1994), which I discussed in Part 0. In that 
unanimous decision, the Court acknowledged the powerful connec-
tion between speaker identity and the persuasive impact of speech.189 
That case involved the closing off of a particular medium of expres-
sion, and thus it did not directly involve a speech restriction directed 
at certain people.190 But it is a small step from acknowledging that 
speaker identity is important to speech to acknowledging that free-
dom of speech must include protection against policies that limit the 
ability of certain people to speak. 
                                                                                                                                 
 187. See Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 84, 84 (1998) (“American free speech doctrine has never been comfortable 
distinguishing among institutions.”). 
 188. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). 
 189. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994). 
 190. See Id. 
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 Another clue to these deeper roots of the speaker discrimination 
doctrine can be found in a 1999 dissent written by Justice Stevens 
and joined by Justice Kennedy. The case of Los Angeles Police 
Deptarment v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.191 concerned a Cali-
fornia law that allowed public access to arrest records only for certain 
prescribed reasons, and specifically prohibited obtaining arrestees’ 
addresses in order to sell products or services.192 Justice Stevens 
thought that the real purpose of the law was to prevent solicitation 
by attorneys, which he thought constitutionally problematic because 
“it relies on discrimination against disfavored speech.”193 One might 
have expected this observation to be backed up solely by a reference 
to Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court’s leading case on free 
speech implications for attorney advertising.194 But Justice Stevens 
offered a footnote offering an additional justification: “Our cases have 
repeatedly frowned on regulations that discriminate based on the 
content of the speech or the identity of the speaker.”195 Thus, in 1999 
Justice Stevens effectively foreshadowed the central argument that 
Justice Kennedy developed more fully in Citizens United. He was able 
to find numerous citations where the Court had struck down speech 
restrictions connected at least in part to the speaker’s identity.196  
 I would argue that the First Amendment’s anti-discrimination po-
tential can be seen even earlier in the 1972 case of Police Department 
of Chicago v. Mosley, which I will argue should be understood as the 
Court’s seminal speaker discrimination case.197 Mosley was one half 
of a pair of free speech cases that stemmed from racial conflict in ur-
ban Illinois schools in the late 1960s.198 Earl Mosley was prosecuted 
for picketing a local high school, carrying a sign that said “ ‘Jones 
High School practices black discrimination. Jones High School has a 
black quota.’ ”199 He believed that the school deliberately kept its 
black enrollment artificially low so that white students would remain 
in the majority.200 In the companion case, Grayned v. City of Rock-
ford, demonstrators protested the exclusion of black students from 
the cheerleading team, called for the hiring of black teachers, and 
                                                                                                                                 
 191. 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999). 
 192. The seven Justice majority upheld the statute on the narrow ground that the case 
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 193. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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 198. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 105 (1972). 
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87), 1971 WL 133359, at *6. 
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called for the inclusion of black history in the school curriculum.201 In 
both cases, the demonstrators were prosecuted under ordinances that 
banned picketing outside schools, but an exception was made for “the 
peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.”202 The 
exception applied only to “labor picketing,”203 and it is clear that this 
meant picketing by school employee union members, not by students, 
parents, or other activists.204 
 The Supreme Court found that Mosley’s First Amendment rights 
were violated. Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall framed the 
case this way: “The question we consider here is whether this selec-
tive exclusion from a public place is permitted. Our answer is 
‘No.’ ”205 Echoing Neimotko, the Court explained that “we analyze this 
ordinance in terms of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Of course, the equal protection claim in this case is 
closely intertwined with First Amendment interests . . . .”206 As in 
Neimotko, the Mosley Court never explained precisely how the two 
Amendments applied, but it is worth pausing over the matter.  
 It is not immediately obvious that the Chicago/Rockford ordinanc-
es would have failed equal protection analysis independent of free 
speech concerns. The case would have been easier under the Four-
teenth Amendment if the Chicago and Rockford police had targeted 
picketers by race, but the demonstrators made no such claim. In fact, 
although the subject of the protests was race, the protestors made a 
point of telling the Court that the demonstrators were a racially 
mixed group.207 Moreover, the cities had plausible rationales for al-
lowing only labor pickets outside schools. They argued that picketing 
outside schools generally disrupts education, but that labor picketing 
was usually non-disruptive and that prohibiting it might be problem-
                                                                                                                                 
 201. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 105. 
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atic under labor law.208 Thus, using Fourteenth Amendment analysis 
alone, the Chicago/Rockford ordinances might have survived under 
rational basis review.209  
 The Mosley and Grayned cases thus turned on free speech, not 
equal protection alone, or alternatively on a holistic understanding of 
the intersection of the two. The question is what kind of speech re-
striction did the Chicago/Rockford ordinances impose? The Court al-
luded to the idea of speaker discrimination by characterizing the or-
dinances as “selective exclusion.” But rather than expand on this 
idea, Justice Marshall’s opinion shifts to the more familiar ground of 
content discrimination: “The central problem with Chicago’s ordi-
nance is that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject 
matter. Peaceful picketing on the subject of a school’s labor-
management dispute is permitted, but all other peaceful picketing is 
prohibited. The operative distinction is the message on a picket 
sign.”210 This is only partially correct. Of course limiting picketing 
rights to labor unions will effectively predetermine the range of views 
that will be expressed on the picket signs. But content discrimination 
is only half the story in Mosley, if that much. A teacher’s union on 
strike might express opinions on a wide range of issues, from working 
hours and wages to curricular concerns. The ordinances did not pre-
scribe that picketing may only address issues that are subject to la-
bor negotiations. Rather, they simply limited who could picket.  
 The civil rights dispute that gave birth to the Mosley and Grayned 
cases illustrate why the issue was more about who could speak, not 
about what they would be allowed to say. Although we know that 
employee unions were permitted to picket, we do not know what their 
views were about the protestors’ demands. What we know is that the 
schools in these cities were embroiled in a volatile and high stakes 
debate about racial discrimination in the daily life of American public 
education. These racial issues in the schools affected many groups of 
people, including the school staff, students and parents.211 Most of the 
picketers were students protesting conditions in their own schools.212 
Writing separately about the Illinois school protests in the Grayned 
decision, Justice Douglas noted that most of the picketers were stu-
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dents protesting conditions in their own school and that this kind of 
dissent represents “the best First Amendment tradition.”213 But un-
der the Chicago and Rockford ordinances, only the employees were 
permitted to engage in this tradition. It would not matter what side 
the employees took, even if the employees were divided. Only the 
employees had the right to speak. Regrettably, the facts of Mosley 
have been largely forgotten, and the case has been cited to uphold 
forms of speaker discrimination. For instance, in the case about ex-
cluding non-residents from town meetings the Eleventh Circuit cited 
Mosley for the proposition that only exclusions based on content were 
impermissible under the First Amendment.214 I would suggest that is 
a misreading of the case because it ignores the facts of the dispute 
and thus disregards the context for the Court’s concern about “selec-
tive exclusion.”215 
 The speech restriction in Mosley offends the First Amendment for 
reasons explained in Citizens United: “By taking the right to speak 
from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives the dis-
advantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive to es-
tablish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s voice.”216 In this 
way, Mosley should be understood as the Court’s first, clear speaker 
discrimination case. But its holding was not coherently and persua-
sively explained by the Court until thirty-eight years later.217 If the 
Court had expanded more on what it meant by “selective exclusion” 
in Mosley, we might have had four decades of jurisprudence refining 
the principle of speaker discrimination. Instead, the idea remained 
dormant until its clearer articulation in Citizens United.218  
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VII.   A POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE  
A.   Limiting Who May Speak in the Limited Public Forum 
 The Supreme Court launched forum doctrine in the early 1970s––
Mosley is one of the seminal sources––and it has since come to occupy 
a decisive place in free speech cases.219 The basic premise of forum 
doctrine is fairly straightforward. We understand that a march on 
Washington or a protest in a green outside city hall should be pro-
tected strongly by the First Amendment––the classic public forum. 
Our Constitution allows protestors to picket outside the White 
House, but they cannot storm into the Oval Office to express their 
views, for the obvious reason that this would disrupt the ability of the 
government to carry out its normal functions. By the same token, the 
First Amendment does not entitle people to disrupt classes in a pub-
lic school or obstruct a military training exercise just because they 
have something to say. At the extremes, these distinctions are not 
difficult or especially controversial. But the challenge is in articulat-
ing a doctrinal basis for making these distinctions, which becomes 
essential in the more difficult cases. 
 In the background, there is a difference between free speech on 
public versus private property. The Court has found that there is lit-
tle free speech protection on private property, so that shopping malls 
are allowed to exclude protestors.220 But this bright line is inadequate 
to explain the difference between different kinds of public property––
the public square versus a public high school classroom, for example. 
To explain why different kinds of government property are different, 
the courts developed the idea of a traditional public forum, with the 
National Mall held up at the quintessential forum where the gov-
ernment would be especially hard pressed to justify restrictions on 
what can be said.221 By contrast, in nonpublic fora––schools, prisons, 
government offices––the government has more latitude to restrict 
speech.222 
 The Mosley case played a critical role in the emergence of this doc-
trine.223 The Mosley judgment includes a broad statement about the 
constitutional evils of any measures that “restrict expression because 
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”224 But as 
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others have ably pointed out: “Such a sweeping pronouncement can 
only work (if at all) in a prescribed area. The Court has accordingly 
applied it only to direct governmental regulation of expression and 
regulation within the traditional public fora of streets, parks, and 
sidewalks.”225 In the companion case of Grayned, the Court clarified 
that the government could in fact restrict how people express them-
selves in public places, for instance through a noise ordinance, so 
long as such time, place, and manner restrictions were content neu-
tral and narrowly tailored to further the State’s legitimate interest.226 
 The idea is simple enough on the surface. But forum doctrine has 
turned out to be more complicated than one might have initially 
thought.227 We have already seen in Part 0 some of the challenges in 
the limited public forum cases such as Perry and Cornelius, where 
the Court gave governments wide latitude to restrict access to non-
traditional channels of communication. But we have also seen in the 
Good News Club case that the rule prohibiting viewpoint discrimina-
tion can restrict government power even in limited public fora. This 
raises the question whether limited public fora––or at least some lim-
ited for a––may not be consequentially different from more tradition-
al public fora, at least in some cases, some of the time.  It may not be 
so easy to distinguish content from viewpoint in many cases. Moreo-
ver, it remains unclear why the government could exclude the 
NAACP from a charity drive in Cornelius because it is “controver-
sial,” but a religious group could not be excluded from school 
grounds.228  
 A common complaint about forum doctrine is that it has distracted 
judges from the values at the heart of the First Amendment. Courts 
have recognized a wide range of fora where the government needs to 
be able to restrict speech in order to function. School, prisons, mili-
tary bases, government offices, and courtrooms are indeed leading 
examples. Thus, a great deal of recent free speech litigation focuses 
on whether the location and context where a person wishes to speak 
constitutes a public forum and, if not, on whether the government 
has a legitimate reason to restrict the speech. Rather than grapple 
with the value (and potential harm) of permitting different kinds of 
speech in different contexts, free speech cases now often turn on for-
malistic categorization of the forum. Within less than two decades of 
its birth, a leading scholar summarized the situation: 
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The doctrine has in fact become a serious obstacle not only to sen-
sitive first amendment analysis, but also to a realistic appreciation 
of the government's requirements in controlling its own property. 
It has received nearly universal condemnation from commentators 
and is in such a state of disrepair as to require a fundamental re-
appraisal of its origins and purposes.229 
 As Aaron H. Caplan has described, not only is there confusion 
about what constitutes a public forum, but confusion also surrounds 
how many categories of public fora exist.230 In practical terms, forum 
doctrine has redefined the playing field of free speech cases. Much as 
in an equal protection case, the battle is often won or lost by defining 
the level of scrutiny to apply; free speech cases are often won or lost 
in a struggle to define the context where the speech takes place. If it 
is a public forum, the government will probably lose. If it is a nonpub-
lic forum, the restrictions on expression are likely to be upheld. The 
struggle to define different kinds of fora has become the dominant 
question for some lower courts in many free speech cases.231 This of-
ten produces confused reasoning in cases that might have been re-
solved more directly through other means.232 Justice Breyer warned 
that the tendency to rely on rigid categorizations of different fora 
might “turn ‘free speech’ doctrine into a jurisprudence of labels.”233 
 The touchstone for making this categorization is whether the 
place(s) in question “have traditionally served as a place for free pub-
lic assembly and communication of thoughts by private citi-
zens . . . .”234 By its nature, the traditional use test is difficult to adapt 
to any new situation that has no obvious root in tradition. Forum 
doctrine shifted the focus from the expression at issue––this being 
the natural focus of a free speech controversy––to a more abstract 
inquiry into the nature of a particular location.235 It is rooted in a 
nostalgic, romantic idea of public debate in the village square, and 
thus it is at best only useful to handle the kinds of fora that might 
have been known in Eighteenth or Nineteenth Century New Eng-
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land. These sorts of locations are physically bounded.236 But what 
about the Internet? Our most vibrant new expressive forum is not 
just non-traditional; the Internet is not rooted in any particular phys-
ical space. The erosion of physical boundaries for speech makes it in-
creasingly important to delineate whether a speech limitation is tied 
to a forum or the people who inhabit that forum. But forum doctrine 
has offered few tools by which to draw this line.  
 Having announced in Citizens United that speaker discrimination 
offends the First Amendment, the Court needs to reconcile how this 
principle coexists with the statements in Perry and Cornelius affirm-
ing identity-based restrictions in limited public fora.237 The most 
straightforward answer would seem to be that identity-based re-
strictions, much like content limitations, may be upheld if reasonably 
tied to the purposes of the forum. I would argue that forum-based 
speech restrictions may be unreasonable if they begin to follow the 
person, rather than remaining rooted in the particular forum. As we 
have seen in the Citizens United dissent, there can be a dangerous 
slippage from case law allowing speech restrictions in a limited pub-
lic forum, such as a school or a military base, to restrictions on the 
expressive rights of the people who inhabit that forum.238 I would ar-
gue that the prohibition on speaker discrimination in Citizens United 
should operate as a limiting principle on forum-based speech re-
strictions. Forum doctrine permits the government to designate dif-
ferent levels of permissible speech in different contexts. But the 
speaker discrimination doctrine is based on the premise that the gov-
ernment cannot establish different degrees of free speech for different 
classes of people. Forum-based restrictions would go too far if they 
produced a situation where an entire class of people has less free 
speech at all times.  
 The introduction of a limiting principle on forum doctrine can be 
helpful in resolving cases that have proven challenging for the courts 
and worrying for commentators. As Erwin Chemerinsky observed, a 
central problem with relaxed constitutional scrutiny on speech re-
strictions in schools, prisons, and the military is that “these are the 
places where judicial review is most essential. . . . Unfortunately, in-
dividuals in these institutions generally have nowhere else to turn 
for protection.”239 In the realm of freedom of speech, speaker discrim-
ination addresses this worry, at least in part, but perhaps not in the 
direct manner that Chemerinsky originally sought. It draws a clearer 
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outer boundary around the principals’ authority over their schools or 
on military commanders’ authority over their units and bases. It en-
sures that these otherwise powerless people retain the opportunity to 
express themselves and to have a voice in society at least in some 
portion of their lives.  
B.   The Case of School Speech 
 Many different types of limited fora have given rise to their own 
speech restrictions concerning the people who inhabit the particular 
forum at issue, and for each there is a different line of First Amend-
ment case law. To name just a few: There are cases about the mili-
tary.240 There are cases about public school teachers.241 There are cas-
es about public prosecutors.242 These cases largely follow a common 
logic.243 There is tension between the free speech rights of the affected 
individuals and the operational and managerial needs of the govern-
ment agency with which they work. With each progressive fact pat-
tern the Court struggles to articulate how this balance should be 
struck. But each context involves its own complexity, and so it not 
possible to explore them all in a single article. 
 To illustrate how speaker discrimination may act as a limiting 
principle on forum-based speech restrictions, I will focus here on cas-
es involving students’ speech in public schools. In particular, I will 
focus on cases where schools seek to punish off-campus speech by 
students, a challenge which is coming up with increasing urgency in 
school speech cases, especially as schools seek to control bullying on 
social media.  
 We know from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District and its progeny that the First Amendment does apply 
in school, yet schools may prohibit speech that would cause “substan-
tial disruption” to school activities.244 This means, for example, that 
schools have significantly more latitude to discipline students who 
use vulgarity at school than the government would normally have to 
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punish vulgarity on the street.245 We also know from Morse v. Freder-
ick that a high school principal can punish a student for displaying a 
pro-drug use sign at a school-sanctioned event off campus.246 This 
might seem to prove that forum-based restrictions need not be lim-
ited by campus boundaries. But Morse is about the authority of the 
principal at a school event, not the general free speech rights of stu-
dents out of school.247  
 The Supreme Court has offered much less guidance with regard to 
student speech that originates off-campus and not at any school-
function, yet nevertheless impacts school life in some way.248 Can a 
school that has a strong anti-drug policy on campus punish a student 
for signing an online petition to legalize marijuana? A school may 
require respect for authority on school grounds, but can it punish a 
student for criticizing school officials on a website? Bullying would 
probably be the most sympathetic case for an expanded view of school 
authority. But is bullying a fellow high school student on Facebook or 
Instagram––off campus and outside school hours—the same as doing 
so in school hallways or at a school events?  
 It is unfortunate that courts considering such school speech prob-
lems do not usually consider the facts of Mosley. As we have seen, 
Mosley can be understood as a speaker discrimination case. But it 
can also be seen as a school speech case, arising as it does from pro-
tests by students and members of the community about policies in-
side public schools. They were doing so just barely off campus, but 
the cities of Chicago and Rockford argued that the protests disrupted 
education. Mosley and Grayned concerned criminal prosecution. But 
what if the discipline had been imposed on student protestors by the 
schools themselves?  
 If the punishment in Mosley and Grayned had been meted out by 
school authorities, the cases might have appeared different to some 
courts, even though it would still be a government official using state 
power to limit who can protest. Some lower courts have assumed that 
Tinker applies whenever schools use their student disciplinary au-
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thority to regulate expression, no matter where the expression takes 
place.249 This is sometimes justified by Tinker’s holding that schools 
may limit speech that poses a substantial disruption to education. 
This rationale has a sweeping impact, since virtually anything in the 
lives of a student may have a substantial disruption on their school-
ing. As a result, teenagers would effectively enjoy far more limited 
version of the First Amendment other Americans, not just at school 
events and on school grounds, but at all times and in all places.  
 Arguably, the Supreme Court has already addressed the off-
campus question, at least in passing. In Fraser, where a student was 
disciplined for giving a profanity-laden speech at a school event, the 
Court said: “Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum 
outside the school context, it would have been protected.”250 Never-
theless, in the absence of a clearer Supreme Court decision about off-
campus student speech, lack of clarity has emerged at the circuit 
court level.251 It would be customary to call this a circuit split, but on 
close reading it seems more that several circuits have deliberately 
adopted a fact-specific approach that consciously refuses to resolve 
the doctrinal problem in any predictable way.252 It is thus not entirely 
clear that the circuits are really split, or if they are all equally and 
similarly confused. This is perhaps understandable, given the ex-
tremes of the kind of expressions to which teenagers are prone. But it 
also leaves students with little clear notice about the limits of free-
dom of speech. 
 Two recent cases from the Courts of Appeals for the Third and 
Ninth Circuits illustrate the challenge for school districts and courts. 
In Layshock v. Hermitage School District, the Third Circuit sitting en 
banc refused to apply Tinker to a seventeen-year-old who used his 
grandmother’s computer to create a profane MySpace parody of his 
high school principal.253 The Third Circuit suggested that deference 
to school discipline “rests, in large measure, upon the supposition 
that the arm of authority does not reach beyond the schoolhouse 
gate.”254 But the court held back from resolving the issue definitive-
ly.255 Two concurring judges wrote separately to stress that Tinker 
“can be applicable to off-campus speech.”256 
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 The reasons for the Third Circuit’s hesitation may be evident in 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wynar v. Douglas County School Dis-
trict.257 Operating entirely off campus, a Nevada high school student 
sent specific and escalating instant messages to friends threatening 
to conduct a school shooting on a specific date, after which the school 
expelled him.258 Noting the obvious, the court observed that “[a] stu-
dent’s profanity-laced parody of a principal is hardly the same as a 
threat of a school shooting,” and held that the student’s First 
Amendment rights were not violated.259 This much is probably uncon-
testable. But the Ninth Circuit waded into more problematic waters 
by reasoning that Landon’s threats were not protected speech be-
cause of Tinker and because he was a student, rather than because 
such threats are never protected no matter who the speaker may 
be.260 Inside or outside school, violent threats and intimidation are 
not protected by the First Amendment.261 The shooting threats were 
likely a Class C Felony under Nevada criminal law.262 It is thus not 
clear why the court needed to adopt the lower level of free speech 
protection inherent in Tinker.263 By doing so, the Court of Appeals left 
the door open to the possibility that students simply have less free 
speech rights than other people. This is the kind of slippage from fo-
rum-based restrictions to person-based restrictions for which Citizens 
United ought to be highly relevant. 
 The nagging question is what schools may do about off campus 
bullying that stops short of threats of violence, but where the poten-
tial for severe emotional distress among teenagers deserves consider-
able public concern.264 I would suggest that for out of school bullying, 
the key First Amendment touchstone is probably Snyder v. Phelps,265 
instead of Tinker. In Snyder, the Court found that the First Amend-
ment prevents a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress for homophobic picketing at a military funeral, even though 
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such picketing inflicts serious emotional pain on its targets.266 But 
while this seems to indicate an unsympathetic response to the perils 
of bullying, Snyder actually leaves open several possibilities for 
schools to address social media bullying in a constitutional manner. 
Snyder turned on the distinction between speech that is a matter of 
public concern, not purely private speech.267 Snyder does not elimi-
nate the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Snyder, 
the picketing involved an issue that was the subject of public debate–
–the presence of gays in the military.268 And it took place outside, in 
public areas.269 Schools may thus have greater latitude where the 
bullying involves private speech or does not touch on matters of pub-
lic concern. In other words, schools might be able to discipline stu-
dents whenever a tort for infliction of emotional distress could sur-
vive First Amendment scrutiny.  
 The speaker discrimination doctrine should not necessarily pre-
clude schools exercising some authority over student conduct off 
campus. But as courts confront these cases, Citizen United should 
add a limiting factor to the analysis. The more schools assert authori-
ty off campus, the more it is essential to ensure that their students 
are not excluded as a class from the full benefits of the First Amend-
ment. Schools are on safe ground if they take action that would nor-
mally be constitutionally permitted if taken against an adult outside 
the school context. Thus, the First Amendment should not prevent 
schools from intervening if students engage in private speech that 
might constitute an actionable tort for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress or in speech prosecutable under criminal statutes. The 
Wynar and Layshock holdings are explainable in these terms. The 
advantage of this approach is that it would not render students any 
less protected by the First Amendment than any other person. But 
courts invite schools to tread into more treacherous territory by ap-
plying Tinker outside of school because this approach appears to re-
strict students’ free speech based on their identity, and without any 
clear limiting principle. Bringing speaker discrimination doctrine in-
to this analysis can clarify this area of law by offering a limiting 
principle to prevent sensible forum-based restrictions on speech from 
restricting free expression for whole categories of people.  
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 The principle that speaker discrimination offends the First 
Amendment is founded on three related insights. First, by regulating 
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who may speak, the government could gain a powerful tool to control 
the content of what is said since, on average, personal identity corre-
lates with political opinions. Second, even where the content of 
speech appears identical, the identity of a speaker shapes how the 
content of communication is received and interpreted. Third, freedom 
of speech in a democracy involves the right to have a voice and an 
opportunity for self-expression, independent of the content of what 
one chooses to say.  
 Now that this doctrine of speaker discrimination is clearly articu-
lated, the next step is for its application to be tested in other circum-
stances, outside the election context, and, perhaps, to reassess some 
older cases as well. As we have seen, there is a need to reconcile the 
speaker discrimination doctrine with the Court’s jurisprudence gov-
erning restrictions on limited public fora. In addition, the speaker 
discrimination principle appears to be in tension with other cases in 
two main areas, each of which deserves reconsideration in light of 
Citizens United: one concerns prohibitions on non-citizens participat-
ing in election campaigns.270 This restriction remains good law even 
though it has been clear for nearly seven decades that “[f]reedom of 
speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country.”271 
Even if one accepts that there is a strong government interest in pre-
venting foreigners from corrupting American elections, it is not clear 
why this interest extends to long term residents of the United States 
just as much as to noncitizens who reside abroad. Moreover, it is un-
clear why the Court has embraced disclosure rules as a suitable rem-
edy for the dangers posed by unrestrained money in politics, but does 
not see disclosure as sufficient to guard against the danger posed by 
noncitizens participation in campaign funding. 
 Another area of tension concerns electioneering by public employ-
ees. In the 1973 decision United States Civil Service Commission v. 
National Association of Letter Carriers, the Court upheld the Hatch 
Act’s restrictions on public employees taking “an active part in politi-
cal management or in political campaigns,” even when they are off 
duty.272 But the broad sweep of the Hatch Act was amended by Con-
gress in 1993, substantially limiting the impact of this decision.273 
Moreover, in 1990 the Court issued a decision protecting the First 
Amendment right of public employees to private partisan political 
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affiliations in a non-election context.274 Especially after Citizens Unit-
ed’s emphatic rejection of identity-based restrictions on speech, there is 
reason to question whether Letter Carriers remains on solid footing. 
 It seems relevant that the cases that seem most in conflict with 
the speaker discrimination principle relate to elections, and so the 
zone of difficulty may be specific to the ambivalence that surrounds 
any regulation of partisan speech in an electoral democracy. For bet-
ter or for worse, in Citizens United and McCutcheon, the Court point-
edly rejected the proposition that fear of the appearance of corruption 
is sufficient to justify a restriction on political speech, limiting the 
anti-corruption rationale to quid pro quo exchanges of money for offi-
cial acts.275 The Court needs now to re-examine why––or if––the in-
volvement of non-citizen residents or public servants in election cam-
paign pose a greater risk of corruption.276 These are questions for the 
future, but they illustrate the potential capacity for the speaker dis-
crimination doctrine to bring coherency to areas of free speech juris-
prudence that have been conflicted up to now.  
 One has to wonder if the sharp divisions on the Court about cam-
paign finance regulation clouded the dissenters’ ability to see this as 
a potential area of agreement. My argument is that critics of the Citi-
zens United decision, beginning with the four dissenting justices, 
have not understood the importance and value of the speaker dis-
crimination principle. In my view, they were confused by free speech 
case law that had over-emphasized forum and devalued expression 
by a diversity of voices. Disagreement about many aspects of Citizens 
United related to campaign financing will go on. But its holding with 
regard to speaker discrimination deserves wide support.  
 The Supreme Court’s articulation of a new pillar of free speech 
law calls out for lawyers to bring cases that ask the Supreme Court 
to apply the speaker discrimination principle outside the corporate 
context. Such cases can be an important test of whether the Roberts 
Court is in actuality a “free speech court” or merely a conservative 
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court that favors corporations.277 Assuming that the Court meant 
what it said, the articulation of the speaker discrimination doctrine is 
a positive development. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
having a voice in public life plays a role in the struggle for respect in 
a diverse society. That is a good thing. 
                                                                                                                                 
 277. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Freedom of Speech, Speech at the 
Federal Communications Bar Association’s Distinguished Speaker Series (Dec. 17, 2010), 
in 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 579, 579, 582 (2011) (arguing that the Roberts Court has not con-
sistently defended free speech, except when consistent with conservative ideology). 
